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2ALTERNATE ROUTES OF REFORMIST ACTIVISM:
MEDICAL MARIJUANA AS A CASE STUDY OF INITIATIVES
WITHIN AND BEYOND STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED
CHANNELS
Introduction:
As news reports detail the growing problems of crack cocaine and heroin abuse
in the inner city, marijuana seems to have drifted from the spotlight of public
alarm. According to a recent article in the Atlantic Monthly, however, this im-
pression is deceptive, as marijuana use remains a major and growing concern
for law enforcement ocials nationwide. The article contends that today there
may be more people in federal and state prisons for marijuana oenses than at
any other time in U.S. history.' But despite the laws prohibiting marijuana,
many remain ardent supporters of the substance, claiming that it will one day
be hailed as a safe and inexpensive miracle drug.2 These supporters maintain,
as medical marijuana expert Dr. Lester Grinspoon of Harvard Medical School
has stated, that opposition to the drug's medical use stems from the largely
irrational fears of many people in government f who] see marijuana as a catalyst
to authority questioning... because of its association with the authority ques-
tioning movements of the 1960s. Grinspoon explains that these individuals are
afraid marijuana would become freely available if
'Eric Schiosser, ~Reefer Madness, The Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1994, at
45.
at 47.
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3permitted for medical purposes, and consequently they refuse to allow its use
even under a doctor's supervision.3 However, opponents of medical marijuana
use dismiss claims of the drug's medical eectiveness, and one spokesman for
the opposition has retorted that the pro-legalization folks have been smoking
too much of their own product.4
The struggle between those who support and those who oppose medical use
of marijuana has been playing itself out for approximately a quarter-century, as
private citizens and groups have undertaken repeated initiatives for government
recognition of marijuana's medical eectiveness. These eorts began along the
legislatively prescribed route of petitioning for agency action and appealing
agency decisions in federal court. This approach spawned no changes, however,
and thus proponents of medical marijuana use have pursued other avenues for
reform, leading them to state courts, state legislatures, the halls of Congress,
and elsewhere.
This essay discusses these various legal and political initiatives undertaken
by reformers seeking change in the laws on medical marijuana use. Part I
reviews the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, and marijuana's status
under the Act. Part II recounts the history of initiatives undertaken along
the statutorily prescribed route for the Act's reform: citizens' petitions seeking
administrative action, and court review of administrative decisions. Part
3Telephone interview with Dr. Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Associate
Professor at Harvard Medical school (March 27, 1996).
4Telephone interview with Jesus Arredondo, Deputy Press Secretary for
California Governor Pete Wilson (March 26, 1996).
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4III then surveys other fronts on which citizens and groups have at-
tempted to make progress on the issue of medical marijuana, in the face of
their fruitless eorts through the legislatively prescribed channels. While the
outcomes of the current initiatives have not yet been determined, the conclu-
sion addresses the signicance of the controversy itself, as demonstration of the
multiform power maintained by the people in our federalist democracy.
Part One:
The Controlled Substances Act
In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act5 to address compre-
hensively the growing problem of illegal drug abuse. The Act establishes ve
schedules in which controlled substances are classied, ranging from schedule I
(the strictest restrictions, recognizing no legitimate medical uses) to schedule V
(the least restrictions). Schedule I is reserved for any drug or other substance
(that] has a high potential for abuse, ... no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States, and for which there is a lack of accepted safety
for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.6 Schedule II
also applies to drugs and other substances with a high
5controlled Substances Act, 21 usc xx 801-971 (1994).
6~ x 812(b) (1).
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5potential for abuse, specifying that abuse of the drug or other substance (in
schedule II] may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.7 However,
schedule II is limited to those substances which, despite their abuse potential,
have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or a
currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.8
The Act applies schedule III status to drugs that have a potential for abuse
less that the drugs or other substances in schedules I and II, .. .a currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and for which abuse of
the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence
or high psychological dependence.9 Schedule IV requires that the drug or other
substance so classied has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or other
substances in schedule III, .. .has a currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States, and is of a nature that abuse of the drug or other substance
may lead to limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to
the drugs or other substances in schedule 111.1.10 Finally, schedule V requires
that a drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs
or other substances in schedule IV, ... has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States, and that abuse of the drug or other substance
may lead to
%j~. x 812(b) (3).
10~ x 812(b) (4).
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6limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the drugs
or other substances in schedule IV.1'
Sections 811 and 812 of the Act make clear that the initial classication of
drugs and other substances within these ve schedules was subject to change. In
its initial sorting of specic drugs into the ve schedules, Section 812 states that
Such schedules shall initially consist of the substances listed in this section,t2
and species that the initial classication of a drug in a particular schedule
only applied unless and until amended pursuant to section 811 of this title.13
Section 811 vests in the Attorney General the authority to add drugs and other
substances to a schedule and to transfer them between schedules, upon a nding
that there is a potential for abuse and that the drug or other substance ts the
criteria of the particular schedule. The Act also gives the Attorney General the
power to remove drugs or other substances from the schedules altogether, upon
a nding that the substances do not meet the requirements for inclusion in any
schedule.
Proceedings for changing a substance's status may be undertaken at the initi-
ation of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Health and Human Services14,
or on the petition of any interested party.'5 The Act provides that, following
~ x 812(b) (5).
12.I~~ x 812(a).
13j~ x 812(c).
141n 1979, the Department of Health and Human Services became the
successor in authority to the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, x
509, 93 Stat. 668, 695 (1979).
~~21 usc x 811(a). secretary, as mentioned in 21 usc x 811(a), is
5
7the initiation of such proceedings, the Attorney General should request from
the Secretary a scientic and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as
to whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed as
a controlled substance. The Secretary's evaluation should address those of the
Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules involving scientic or
medical judgments: scientic evidence of its pharmacological eect, if known,
the state of current scientic knowledge, potential risks to the public health,
potential for psychological dependence, and whether the substance is an im-
mediate precursor to a substance already controlled.6 The Act further declares
that the Secretary's written recommendation about the appropriate scheduling
of the substance shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such scientic
and medical matters,17 which the Attorney General shall consider along with
the substance's propensity for abuse.18
The Act specically acknowledges the importance of controlled substances
for medical use. It states that many of the drugs included.., have a useful and
legitimate medical
dened in 21 usc x 802(24) as the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
16~ x 811(c).
18j~. x 811(c)(1),(4), and (5). Section 811(b) instructs the Attorney General
to defer to the Secretary's judgments on the medical and scientic criteria set
forth in x 811(2), (3), (6), (7), and (8), and to any scientic or medical consider-
ations relevant to the questions of abuse. However, the ultimate determination
on this question of propensity for abuse, as set forth in x 811 (1), (4), and (5),
is left to the Attorney General.
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8purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the
American people,'9 and recognizes legitimate medical uses for those substances
in Schedules II, III, IV, and V. Within this framework, the Act's classication of
marijuana (derived from the cannabis plant) as a Schedule I controlled substance
has aroused marked controversy since the time of the Act's passage, because
opinions dier on whether marijuana has legitimate medical applications.
The Act's legislative history reects a wide divergence of opinion on the issue
of marijuana classication among the drafters of the Act,20 and consequently
the Act established a Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse2' to study
marijuana use and to make recommendations to the President and Congress
about how it should be regulated. Congress' initial scheduling of marijuana as
a Schedule I drug followed the recommendations of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) 22 As explained above, Congress delegated to
HEW the authority to make determinations about the medical and scientic
criteria for drug scheduling because HEW had an expertise in this area that
the Attorney General lacked. Congress delegated any future modications of
scheduling to the Department of Justice (via the Attorney General), but made
the initial classications itself, and therein followed
19~ x 801(1).
20H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, Interstate and Foreign commerce committee, 91st
cong., 2d Sess. (sept. 10, 1970).
2121 usc x 801, Sec. 601.
221n 1979, the Department of Health and Human Services replaced the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as the authority on such
scientic matters. ~ ~ note 14.
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9HEW's recommendations in much the same way that it recommended the At-
torney General follow them for future determinations.
HEW's recommendation, which Congress adopted in its initial scheduling
of marijuana, was that marihuana be retained within schedule I at least until
the completion of certain studies now underway23. However, the Commission's
ndings never led to an alteration in the scheduling of marijuana, and private
citizens favoring rescheduling soon invoked their power under the Act to initiate
a review of the scheduling determination.
Part Two:
History of Administrative and Court Action
under the Controlled Substances Act
As mentioned previously, the Controlled Substances Act provides that any inter-
ested party may petition the Department of Justice for a change in the schedul-
ing of a drug2 This provision was rst invoked in 1972, by the National Organi-
zation for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), a citizens group founded
in 1970 in Washington D.C. by R. Keith Stroup, a concerned attorney35
23H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, ~ note 20.
2421 usc x 811(a) (2) provides that such a change may be initiated by the Attor-
ney General of the Department of Justice either at his request, the secretary's
request, or on the petition of any interested party. NORML petitioned the
BNDD because that was the bureau to which the Attorney General had dele-
gated such matters.
25Telephone interview with Allen St. Pierre, Deputy National Director of NORML
(January 17, 1996).
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10In 1972, NORMI petitioned the branch of the DOJ designated for such issues,
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). Joined in its petition
by the Institute for the Study of Health and Society and the American Public
Health Association, NQRML requested either the elimination of restrictions on
marijuana or its reclassication as a Schedule V controlled substance. Invok-
ing 21 USC 811 (b) and (c)~, the petitioners asserted that the question must
be passed on to the Secretary of HEW, since it raised scientic and medical
questions.
The BNDD disagreed, however, pointing to section 202(b), which exempts
from such review drug controls that are required by United States obligations
under an international treaty, convention, or protocol, in eect on the eective
date of this part, and to section 201(d), which states that if control is required
by United States obligations under international treaties, the authority vested
in other agencies elsewhere in the Act does not apply and the Attorney General
(whose authority was delegated to BNDD through the DOJ) shall issue an order
controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate to carry
out such obligations.27 The BNDD concluded that the United States had such
an international obligation regarding marijuana control, as a party to the Single
Convention on
26Note: 21 usc x 811 and 812 are equivalent to Pub. L. No. 91-513, title
II, xx 201 and 202. NORML sometimes refers to them as xx 201 and 202.
However, for purposes of clarity, they will be cited as xx 811 and 812
throughout this discussion.
2721 usc x 811(d).
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11Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407 (1967). On this basis, the Director of the
BNDD, John Ingersoll, maintained that he held full authority to control mari-
juana in the schedule most appropriate to carry out international obligations of
the United States. 28 However, Ingersoll oered no analysis of why the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs required marijuana to be placed specically in
Schedule I of Act; he concluded only that the Single Convention required some
sort of control over marijuana, without providing any justication for his choice
of Schedule I.
In fact, the Single Convention clearly would have allowed the use of mari-
juana for medical purposes. The Convention's General Obligations stated that
the parties must take measures necessary to limit exclusively to medical and sci-
entic purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of,
trade in, use and possession of drugs.29 The Single Convention places marijuana
in its most restrictive category, Schedule IV of the Convention, thereby restrict-
ing it to only medical and scientic uses, but clearly allowing those specic uses.
Although the Convention suggests that nations may elect for stronger measures
in exceptional circumstances where the threat to the public health and welfare
is exceedingly great,30 it clearly
2837 Fed. Reg. 18097 (1972)
29Single convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30-Aug. 1, 1961, art.
4(1)(c), 18 U5T 1407, 1413.
301d at 1411. Article 2(5)(b) of the convention states that a nation may, in
such circumstances, elect to prohibit the production, manufacture, export and
import of, trade in, possession or use of any such drug except for amounts which
may be necessary for medical and scientic research only.
10
12does not require such action, as it condones medical use of substances under its
Schedule IV.31 The Convention does place some additional restrictions speci-
cally on marijuana, yet these too would allow medical use. These restrictions,
invoked by Article 28: Control of Cannabis, make applicable to marijuana the
system of controls as provided in article 23 respecting the control of opium
poppy.32 That section provides for the establishment of national agencies to
oversee the production and distribution of the drug, by designating areas for
cultivation, licensing growers, and serving as a clearinghouse for crops.33 How-
ever, the article underscores again the acceptability of medicinal use of the drug,
stating that while the agency shall have the exclusive right of importing, ex-
porting, wholesale trading and maintaining stocks, ... parties need not extend
this exclusive right to medicinal opium and opium preparations.34
Thus, because it permits medical uses of marijuana, the Single Convention
would have allowed the United States to
31j~ at 1411. Article 2(1) and (5) of the convention indicate that
articles 4(c), 19, 20, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 37 all apply to Schedule
iV drugs. Medical use of a drug is consistent with all of these articles.
It is an interesting caveat that when amendments to the single convention
were later proclaimed by u.s. President Gerald Ford, on August 29, 1975, Robert
Ingersoll was the Acting secretary of State and as such he cosigned the proclama-
tion. Like the original convention, these amendments did not prohibit medical
use of marijuana, although they did provide that a party could elect to prohibit
all cultivation if it found such a measure necessary. It is unclear whether this
underscoring of article 39 of the original convention (which allowed nations to
establish stricter measures domestically than the standards mandated by the
convention) was triggered in part by the controversy surrounding marijuana's
scheduling..I~.
32~~ at 1421, art. 28(1).
~ at 1419, art. 23. at 1419, art. 23(2)(e).
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13place marijuana in a category less restrictive than Schedule
I. Ingersoll did not, however, address this, as his rejection of NORML's
petition asserted only his general authority to make scheduling determinations
where international obligations were involved, and did not discuss why he chose
to make the determination that he did. Consequently, Ingersoll's response also
avoided addressing any of the petition's substantive arguments for rescheduling
marijuana ~
NORML responded by bringing a law suit against Ingersoll, as prescribed
by section 877 of the Act. Under section 877, any person aggrieved by a nal
decision of the Attorney General may obtain review of the decision in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which
his principal place of business is located. Setting forth the standard of review
(typical for review of agency decisions), section 877 states that ndings of fact
by the Attorney General [or his delegatees], if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive. 36
NORML alleged that Ingersoll had abused his power in rejecting the petition
outright and refusing even to le it for further governmental consideration. The
court agreed that Ingersoll had been overly hasty, and ordered a remand for
further proceedings by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the agency of the
DOJ that had recently taken over the
3537 Fed. Reg. 18097, ~ note 28.
3621 usc x 877.
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14functions delegated to the Attorney General in the Controlled Substances Act
(which had previously been performed by the
BNDD).
The court based its opinion on several strands of argument. Although
NORML had not limited the focus of its original petition to the leaves of the
cannabis plant, NORML argued to the court that the Convention only applies
to cannabis and cannabis resin, which are clearly dened so as to be inapplica-
ble to the plant's leaves. While the government acknowledged this, it urged the
court to arm Ingersoll's order nonetheless, with permission to NORNL to le
another petition limited to the leaves. The court, however, did not accept this
procedural approach, as it claimed that
It is not at all unusual for persons seeking governmental action{ from any
of the branches{ to pray for the maximum desired, or such other relief as may
be deemed appropriate. To say that this may act as a disqualication from
obtaining more limited relief is to strain ordinary conceptions of fair procedure,
in the absence of an express warning or alert.37
In adopting this greater-includes-the-lesser approach to rulemaking peti-
tions, the court enabled NORI~4L to bypass the additional procedural hurdle of
ling another petition in order to have the issue of marijuana leaves addressed.
The court also rejected Ingersoll's contention that the mere presence of an
international obligation involving the substance gave him blanket authority over
its scheduling. On this issue, the court expressed concern that respondent's
v. Ingersoll, 497 F. 654, 659 (1974)
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15own unorthodox procedural devices may have contributed to a procedural im-
passe and a non-responsive discussion on dierent planes of discourse.38 The
court asserted that an outright rejection of a petition is a 'peremptory' action,
soundly used only in 'the clear case of a ling that patently is either decient
in form or a substantive nullity. '~~ This case did not t either of these cate-
gories, the court concluded, and thus such outright rejection was inappropriate.
Rather, Ingersoll owed petitioners a determination on the merits of their re-
quest, in order to foster the interchange [between petitioner and agency] and
renement of views that the court called the lifeblood of a sound administrative
process.
In remanding the case to respondent for consideration on the merits, the
court placed important restrictions on Ingersoll. The court stated that the
Act's special provisions for international obligations extended no further than
necessary to meet international agreements. The court observed that the re-
spondent seems to be saying that even though the treaty does not require more
control than schedule V provides, he can on his own say-so and without any
reason insist on Schedule I, ~ and the court rejected this contention, as it per-
ceived such blanket unilateral authority to be contrary to Congressional intent.
Even regarding the determination of what schedule was required by the Single
38~
~ citing Municipal Light Boards v. FPc, 146 U.5.App. D.C. 294, 298 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.s. 989 (1972).
~'0NoRML v Ingersoll, 497 F. 2d at 660-661.
14
1641~ at 661.
Convention, the court stated that respondent's opinion should not govern
exclusively, and that the views of sources in the State Department and the inter-
national organizations involved should be solicited. However, the court declined
to rule on what course would be required if it were determined that international
obligations allowed the United States latitude in marijuana scheduling depend-
ing on its assessment of the domestic health situation. Specically, the court
left open the question of whether the Department of Justice (through the DEA)
would be required to seek the appraisal of HEW in making such health-related
determinations, or whether it could make such determinations unilaterally ~41
Pursuant to this remand, the DEA undertook a rulemaking proceeding in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 USC 553 and 554,
by publishing notice in the Federal Register that DEA was prepared to hold
a hearing for the petitioners on the issues remanded by the court. Petitioners
responded to this notice by requesting an administrative hearing, and the mat-
ter was brought before an administrative law judge. Although this procedure
made public the administrative law judge's recommendations on the merits of
NORML's petition, it gave the Acting Administrator of the DEA the ultimate
authority to accept or reject that recommendation. In his recommended de-
cision, Administrative Law Judge Lewis F. Parker concluded that the United
States
15
17had no international obligation to control cannabis seeds or articial cannabis,
and suggested that the DEA Administrator request an assessment by the Secre-
tary of HEW regarding their rescheduling or removal from the list of controlled
substances.42 Although Judge Parker determined that the United States is re-
quired by the treaty to control cannabis, cannabis resin, and cannabis leaves, he
concluded that the nation's obligations thereunder can be satised if cannabis
and cannabis resin are placed in Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act
and if cannabis leaves are placed in Schedule V of the Act. For this reason,
Judge Parker suggested that the DEA Administrator request a scientic and
medical evaluation by the Secretary of HEW on these issues as well ~
In his response to Judge Parker's recommended decision, DEA Adminis-
trator Henry S. Dogin agreed that articial cannabis was not governed by any
international agreement, and concluded that it was therefore not an issue in this
proceeding. However, Dogin dismissed Judge Parker's conclusion that cannabis
leaves could be placed in Schedule V. as Dogin found the dierentiation to be
appropriate only in the framework of an academic discussion, since marijuana in
the illicit trac is a mixture of crushed leaves, owers, and twigs. He concluded
therefore that the
421n the Matter of National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws. et al., unpublished opinion, u.s. Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Agency, Administrative Law Judge Lewis F. Parker, May 21,
1975, Docket No. 74-7, 34. at 35.
~40 Fed. Reg. 44164 (1975)
16
18over-the-counter availability carried by Schedule V classication could easily
foster misuse that would violate international obligations. Dogin also rejected
Judge Parker's contention that cannabis seeds need not be controlled under in-
ternational obligations, as Dogin asserted that the seeds can be used to grow
more plants, and thus they must be controlled if the Single Convention's obli-
gations on the plant itself are to be met.45
Dogin did not accept Judge Parker's suggestion that the Secretary of HEW
be consulted regarding a possible rescheduling of the rest of the marijuana plant
to Schedule II, a classication which Parker had found consistent with interna-
tional obligations. Dogin admitted that Schedule II would satisfy the require-
ments of the Single Convention, as he agree[d] that the control mechanisms of
the Act relating to Schedule I or Schedule II are sucient to meet the require-
ments of the Single Convention as to cannabis and cannabis resin.~ However, as
discussed above, the D.C. Circuit had left open the question of whether the DEA
Administrator should seek the HEW Secretary's advice on such a rescheduling
issue, and Dogin asserted that he was not required to do so. He stated that the
court did not repeal Section 201(d) of the Controlled Substances Act, and he
invoked that provision to show that the solution, as Congress resolved it, was
to place in the Attorney General [and his delegatee, the DEA Administrator]
the ability to
at 44167.
46~
17
19resolve mixed questions of law and science and medicine,47 such as those pre-
sented by marijuana scheduling.
Thus Dogin made the scheduling determination without seeking HEW's ad-
vice specically on rescheduling, although he did base his conclusion in part on
the HEW Secretary's position on medical marijuana use, as will be discussed
below. Dogin emphasized that although a Schedule II classication for mar-
ijuana would amply satisfy the Single Convention, any reclassication would
need to be consistent with the Act itself, as Congress intended (and must have
believed) that the Act and the treaty would be consistent.~ Because the Act set
forth ve schedules for controlled substances, the Administrator asserted that
any classication must heed the guidelines of these schedules. He then pointed
out that only Schedule I applied to substances having no accepted medical use
in the United States, and he claimed that marijuana and the cannabis plant
had no such accepted uses.
Dogin based this rejection of medical marijuana use in part on a letter to
the DEA by Acting Secretary of HEW Dr. Theodore Cooper, which concluded
that there is currently no accepted medical use of marihuana in the United
States, and which was published in the same Federal Register notice as Dogin's
decision. Based in part on this letter, Dogin concluded that marijuana had no
accepted medical use, and that therefore placement of marihuana in Schedule I
is less
48~ at 44168
18
20discretionary than mandatory, due to the criteria set forth in the Act itself.49
On this basis, he denied NORML's petition.50
But the dispute was far from over. NORML again sought reconsideration by
the court, and in 1977 the D.C. Circuit handed down its response.5' The court
held that the DEA Administrator had overstepped his authority in assessing
the appropriate classication for marijuana and cannabis under the Act itself.
The Administrator's judgment was limited, the court asserted, to questions
regarding international obligations. On determinations of compliance with the
Act itself, the Administrator was required to share his decisionmaking function
under the Act with the Secretary of HEW. 52 Merely referring to a letter by
the Secretary without consulting him specically on the rescheduling decision
was not sucient. The court reached this conclusion by analyzing both the text
of the Act as well as its legislative history, and it read the latter of these to
reect intense concern with establishing and preserving HEW's avenue of input
into scheduling decisions.53 Thus, the court ruled that the Attorney General's
discretion (delegated to the DEA Administrator) allowed him to disregard only
those HEW recommendations that would lead to scheduling in violation of
501d
51NORML v. DEA, 559 F. 2d 735 (1977).
52~ at 738.
at 746.
19
21international commitments, not to exercise blanket authority over all drugs
carrying any international obligations.54
The court asserted that the proper allocation of decisionmaking responsi-
bility between the Attorney General and the Secretary of HEW, in accordance
with their respective spheres of expertise, enables the Attorney General (though
the DEA) only to determine what minimum level of control is legally required
by international obligations, in order to ensure that the Secretary's recommen-
dation, which ordinarily would be binding as to medical and scientic ndings,
does not cause a substance to be scheduled in violation of treaty obligations.55
Having determined that legal oor, however, the DEA must seek and heed the
HEW Secretary's expert opinion on the other factors of the rescheduling deter-
mination. The court stated that:
Once that minimum schedule [required by international obligations] is es-
tablished by the Attorney General [though the DEAl, the decision whether to
impose controls more restrictive than required by treaty implicates.., medical
and scientic considerations. ... The Secretary of HEW is manifestly more
competent to make these nonlegal evaluations and recommendations.56
Moreover, the court asserted that an absence of accepted medical uses for a
drug does not necessitate that the drug receive Schedule I classication.57 This
deated the DEA's argument that the HEW Secretary's letter, which said only
that marijuana had no currently accepted medical use, was
at 747.
56~
at 748.
20
22dispositive of HEW's position on the rescheduling issue. The court determined
that placement in Schedule I does not appear to ow inevitably from lack of a
currently accepted medical use. The court interpreted the statute to reserve to
HEW a nely tuned balancing process involving several medical and scientic
considerations, such as potential for abuse and danger of dependence. The
court thus found that medical use is but one factor to be considered, and by no
means the most important one, and therefore concluded that by shortcutting
the referral procedures [of the Act] ... the Acting Administrator precluded the
balancing process contemplated by Congress.58 On these grounds, the court
remanded the petition back to DEA, directing the Administrator to refer it
to the Secretary of HEW for the required medical and scientic ndings and
balancing assessments .
The court also discussed some of the controversy's more substantive issues.
Addressing the requirements of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the
court concluded, as the DEA Administrator had conceded, that the United
States could reschedule cannabis and cannabis resin to Schedule II without
violating the agreement. The court did not accept, however, the DEA Adminis-
trator's claim that marijuana leaves could not be in Schedule V without risking
violation of the Single Convention. The court held that, because the treaty
itself distinguished between the leaves and other parts of
58~
~ at 757.
21
23the plant, such a rescheduling was permitted by the Convention, and thus the
DEA Administrator was obliged to refer the petition to HEWA0 Although re-
viewing courts typically grant substantial deference to agency determinations,
the court concluded here, We owe no deference to a statutorily invalid exercise
of discretion.61
Similarly, the court found that the Administrator had abused his discretion
in claiming that cannabis seeds must be controlled in order for international obli-
gations to be met. Because the Single Convention did not specically control
marijuana seeds, the court concluded that The Acting Administrator's nd-
ing, like that regarding cannabis leaves, should have been deferred until after
compliance with the referral and hearing requirements of Section 201(a)-(c).62
The court even stepped beyond the issues raised by the petition itself, in
evaluating the scheduling of synthetic THC63, which was addressed at the hear-
ing but not in the petition. The court asserted that synthetic THC was not
regulated by any international obligation, and that NORML should be given a
means to advocate its reclassication before the DEA even though it was not
included in the original petition.M On this basis, the court set forth specic
guidelines for the mandated review by the Secretary of HEW, which instructed
the Secretary to make separate
at 754.
61~
at 756.
63THC is the principal psychoactive substance in cannabis. ~. at 756
n.88.
~NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 756-757.
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24evaluations of synthetic THC, and of the three cannabis categories (cannabis
resin, cannabis leaves, and cannabis seeds) within the connes of the treaty A5
The DEA Administrator complied with the court's mandate, and secured
a detailed review from the Secretary of HEW, Joseph Califano. The Secretary
based his assessment on a medical and scientic evaluation and recommendation
by the Food and Drug Administration and the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Men-
tal Health AdministrationA6 This procedure, by which these Administrations
review such issues for the Secretary, is required by 21 CFR Part 5, Subpart A,
which delegates to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, with authority to re-
delegate except when specically prohibited, the evaluative authority delegated
to the Assistant Secretary for Health by the Secretary of HHS. Under 21 CFR
5.10(a) (9) and (10), this redelegation applies specically to the Secretary's
functions under the Controlled Substances Act. In his review, the Secretary
explained that his position followed the evaluations of these reviewing Adminis-
trations, which had concluded that each of the listed cannabis materials should
remain in Schedule I.~67 Consequently, the Secretary of HEW only fortied the
DEA Administrator's position.
In reaching his conclusion, the Secretary set forth a thorough evaluation of
the court-specied areas (cannabis
65~ at 757.
~44 Fed. Reg. 36123, 36125 (1979)
67~
68~ at 36123.
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25resin, cannabis leaves, cannabis seeds, and synthetic THC), evaluating them
according to the scientic and medical criteria set forth in section 811 of the
Act69 Thus, the Secretary's review included a discussion of actual or relative
potential for abuse, scientic evidence of its pharmacological eect, potential
risk to public health, psychic or physiological dependence liability, and relation
to other controlled substances.70
However, in discussing his conclusion, which was that all the substances in
question should remain in Schedule I, the Secretary addressed only the medical-
use potential of marijuana, and did not adopt the balancing analysis of other
factors that the court had prescribed on remand.71 The Secretary concluded
that the substances we have reviewed could be placed in either Schedule I or
Schedule II, and he based his Schedule I recommendation on medical-use eval-
uation, discussing none of the other factors set forth by the court or the Act.
Specically, the Secretary concluded that statutory language describing Sched-
ule I substances as having no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States and a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug... under medical
supervision t marijuana better than did the statutory description of Schedule
II.
691d at 36125.
70~ at 36125|36126.
71sections III and IV of the secretary's review presented data about the
statutory criteria, without evaluating that data with reference to the scheduling
determination at hand. Only in section V did the secretary address the petition
for rescheduling, and this section does not address any of these substantive
criteria except medical use..I~.
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26The only other line of reasoning provided by Califano was that since Congress
itself placed marijuana in Schedule I, ... arguments for placement in Schedule II
must be stronger than those for placement in Schedule I to justify rescheduling.72
This position proves particularly noteworthy in light of the Act's legislative his-
tory, which clearly reveals Congress' uncertainty about marijuana scheduling
and its hope that the issue would be reevaluated when more evidence arose73,
and which thus suggests that Congress did not want its initial scheduling deci-
sion to be perceived as a presumptively accurate or binding precedent. Nonethe-
less, it served as partial support for the Secretary's strong recommendation that
all substances in question remain in Schedule I.
On the basis of both the Secretary's evaluation as well as his own perception
of the Act's requirements, the DEA Administrator once again concluded that
marijuana and synthetic THC should remain in Schedule I, and declined to take
any further action on the petitioners' behalf.74 As DEA Administrator Bensinger
wrote, not only was he unable to determine that there exists substantial evidence
to warrant the proposed change, but to the contrary, the evidence supports and
mandates that marijuana and synthetic THC be maintained in Schedule ~
72~ at 36127.
73H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, ~ note 20.
7444 Fed. Reg. 36123, ~ note 66. at 36124.
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27But the battle continued, as NORML soon challenged this conclusion in the D.C.
Circuit. Although the opinion76 was an unpublished disposition that could not
be cited as precedent~, the court did not accept the DEA's conclusions, and
ordered the case remanded to DEA for reconsideration in light of NORI~4L's
arguments regarding medical uses of the substances at issue. The court in-
structed DEA to refer all substances at issue to HHS for medical and scientic
ndings 78
As discussed above, since this matter was in the purview of the FDA'S
expertise, HHS transferred the issue on to that agency under its authority.
Consequently, in 1982, the FDA issued two statements of proposed scheduling
recommendations, one regarding marijuana and its components, and the other
addressing synthetic THC.79 In presenting its recommendation based on the
scientic and medical aspects of marijuana, the FDA considered the factors
for scheduling determinations set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, with
regard to each of three categories of substances:
cannabis and cannabis resin, cannabis leaves, and cannabis seeds capable of
germination. FDA noted that the term marijuana as addressed in the notice
did not include
no. 79-1660 (D.c. cir., October 16, 1980).
77Rule 11(c), 13, Digest of United States courts of ADgeals' Rules, vol.
21 (1992).
7847 Fed. Reg. 28141, 28142 (1982)
7947 Fed. Reg. 10080 (1982) addressed synthetic THC, while 47 Fed. Reg.
28141 (1982) addressed marijuana and its components.
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28certain other extracts from the plant, including seeds incapable of germination.80
In concluding that all three categories of marijuana products belonged in
Schedule I, FDA devoted most of its focus to the issue of accepted medical usage.
FDA interpreted the term accepted medical use to mean lawfully marketed
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act8, and found that none of
the substances at issue t that denition, primarily because there had been
no approval of an NDA for any of them. FDA also rejected the idea that the
substances could meet the schedule II criterion of having a currently accepted
medical use with severe restrictions, holding that although this clause is not
dened in the statute or legislative history, the agency believes that only certain
investigational drugs in the later stages of the investigational process may fall
within this statutory language.82 FDA asserted that although many states had
passed legislation authorizing limited use of marijuana in medical research, such
use was not in the later stages of the investigational process,83 as was the use
of THC (discussed below). Based on this evaluation that marijuana lacked
accepted medical use and that it met the other
80FDA specied that such term [marijuana] does not include the mature
stalks of such plant, ber produced from such stalks (except the resin
extracted therefrom), ber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of
such plant which is incapable of germination. 47 Fed. Reg. 28141,
~ note 78, at 28143.
81~ at 28150.
82~ at 28151.
83~
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29scientic criteria for schedule I, FDA recommended that each of the substances
at issue remain in schedule I ~
FDA also recommended that synthetic THC remain in Schedule II, although
FDA allowed that the future approval of an NDA would provide sucient reason
for rescheduling THC at a later date. After detailing its scientic ndings
on THC, FDA discussed the requirements for each of the ve schedules, and
concluded that THC could reasonably be placed in either Schedule I or Schedule
II. FDA strongly urged, however, that Schedule I status be maintained until the
approval of an NDA for synthetic THC.
In support of this THC recommendation, FDA applied in 1982 the same
Congressional-precedent argument used by DEA in l979~, an approach that
was not used in the 1982 FDA notice on marijuana itself, discussed above. FDA
claimed that where discretion is involved, the status quo created by Congress
should not be changed unless there are clear data requiring the change or iden-
tiable benets to be gained by such change.86 As discussed earlier, Congress
did not intend for its initial and tenuous scheduling decision to receive such
deference.87
FDA did, however, suggest that rescheduling THC to Schedule II would be
expedient once an NDA were approved for the drug,88 and FDA noted that an
NDA had been under
~ at 28152.
8544 Fed. Reg. 36123, ~ note 66.
8647 Fed. Reg. 10080, ~ note 79, at 10086.
87H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, ~ note 20.
8847 Fed Reg 10080, ~ note 79, at 10084.
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30consideration for an antinausea indication since June 25, 1981.89 FDA explained
that approval of such an NDA would provide the regulatory and scientic rea-
son for rescheduling that otherwise remained absent2~ FDA further explained
that an NDA would provide an accepted medical use for THC, thus rendering
Schedule II the appropriate classication for the drug at such a future time.91
Consequently, FDA proposed to recommend that THC remain in schedule I
until an NDA is approved, ... and to conclude that THC not be rescheduled to
schedule II unless and until an NDA is approved for marketing of THC.92
Three years later, the FDA approved such an NDA for synthetic THC,93
and DEA responded by rescheduling the drug (Dronabinol) to Schedule II in
l986.~~ The Administrator explained that his rescheduling was based on the
scientic and medical evaluation and recommendation of the Assistant Secre-
tary for Health and Human Services and on the Food and Drug Administra-
tion approval of a new drug application, but that it must meet international
obligations.95
With regard to international obligations, although synthetic THC was not
included in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, DEA noted that the sub-
stance was controlled
89~ at 10081.
91~ at 10084.
92~ at 10086.
~~21 CFR x 1308; para. 79,051 and 80,862, Food. Drug. and cosmetic Law
~ vol. 2.
~~5l Fed. Reg. 17476 (1986)
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31by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances,~ which had become eective for
the united States in July l98O.~~ In approving the rescheduling of Dronabinol
to Schedule II, DEA sought to insure compliance with that Convention's man-
date that parties prohibit all use except for scientic and very limited medical
purposes, 98 by applying special restrictions to Dronabinol that did not apply
to Schedule II drugs generally.99 DEA set forth a policy stating that:
any person registered by DEA to distribute, prescribe, administer or dis-
pense controlled substances in Schedule II who engages in the distribution or
dispensing of Dronabinol for medical indications outside the approved use... ex-
cept within the connes of a structured and recognized research program, may
subject his or her controlled substance registration to review.., as being inconsis-
tent with the public interest. DEA will take action to revoke that registration if
it is found that such distribution or dispensing constitutes a threat to the public
health and safety, and in addition will pursue any criminal sanctions which may
be warranted.'~
DEA found this policy necessary in response to its observation that practi-
tioner registrants frequently abused their license to prescribe other Schedule II
drugs, by prescribing them for unapproved uses. Such abuses, the DEA Admin-
istrator asserted, must be avoided with particular
96Id
97convention on Psychotropic substances, July 15, 1980, T.I.A.5. No.
9725.
9851 Fed. Reg. 17476, ~j, note 94, at 17477.
99General FDA policy is that all unapproved uses of approved drugs are
lawful if the prescibing physicians deem such uses to be sound medical prac-
tice. FDA Drug Bulletin, October 1972, Rockville MD. This policy states,
FDA is charged with the responsibility for judging the safety and eectiveness
of drugs and the truthfulness of their labeling. The physician is then responsi-
ble for making the nal judgment as to which if any of the available drugs his
patient will receive in the light of the information contained in their labeling
and other data available to him.
10051 Fed. Reg. 17476, ~. note 94, at 17477.
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32diligence in the case of Dronabinol, because of the United States' treaty obliga-
tion. With the special protective policy, the Administrator concluded that the
Convention's obligations would be satised, and thus he formally moved Dron-
abinol to Schedule 11.101 The Federal Register announcement took no action,
however, on the rescheduling of marijuana itself.
Later the same year, DEA issued another Federal Register statement, an-
nouncing a hearing on the NORNL petition for rescheduling marijuana.02 The
D.C. Circuit Court's 1980 remand had required DEA reconsideration and DHHS
recommendations,03 and although DHHS (through the FDA) had issued recom-
mendations regarding both marijuana and synthetic THC in 1982, DEA itself
had not yet responded to the court's remand of the marijuana issue. Since that
court decision, DEA had issued a Federal Register announcement on THC, but
not on marijuana itself. Thus, DEA announced in the Federal Register that
a hearing would be held in August 1986, pursuant to the APA procedures set
forth in 5 USC 556. The announcement reiterated that FDA and HHS had
recommended that marijuana remain in Schedule I.1~
During the preliminary prehearing stage of proceedings, NORML led an
amended petition, changing its request from a call for complete descheduling
or Schedule V rescheduling, to a petition only for a move to Schedule II. At a
prehearing
101~ at 17478.
~51 Fed. Reg. 22946 (1986)
v. DEA, No. 79-1660.
10451 Fed. Reg. 22946, ~ note 102, at 22946-22947.
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33conference on February 20, 1987, the parties stipulated that marijuana has a
high potential for abuse and psychological or physical dependence, and they
agreed on two issues that the administrative law judge should address in deter-
mining whether a transfer of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II would
be legal. These issues were:
(1) Whether the marijuana plant has a currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States, or a currently accepted medical use with
severe restrictions.
(2) Whether there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the marijuana plant
under medical supervision. 105
Subsequently, the parties prepared and assembled their cases, and Admin-
istrative Law Judge Francis Young heard oral argument on the matter on June
10, 1988.106
On September 6, 1988, Judge Young issued his decision recommending a
rescheduling of marijuana to Schedule 11.107 Judge Young focused on two piv-
otal issues: whether marijuana had a currently accepted medical use in treat-
ment in the U.S., and whether there was a lack of accepted safety for use of
the marijuana plant under medical supervision.108 In his decision, Judge Young
discussed the strong evidence that marijuana had a widely accepted medical use
in the treatment of chemotherapy side-eects. He detailed the evidence of oncol-
ogists nationwide acknowledging and advocating the eectiveness of marijuana
in relieving the painful and often
051n the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, unpublished opinion,
u.s. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency, Administra-
tive Law
Judge Francis L. Young, September 6, 1988, Docket No. 86-22, 6.
106~
at 68.
at 7.
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34life-threatening side-eects of cancer treatment, and he concluded that:
From the uncontroverted facts it is clear beyond any question that many
people nd marijuana to have, in the words of the Act, an accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States in eecting relief for cancer patients.
Oncologists... accept this. Other medical practitioners and researchers accept
this. Medical faculty professors accept it. Nurses performing hands-on patient
care accept it. 109
The judge acknowledged that it is impossible to determine if all, or even
51 percent, of the medical community shares these views, but he invoked the
respectable minority standard used by courts in malpractice actions, whereby
a procedure is acceptable if a respectable minority of physicians would nd it
so.110 He concluded that [tlhe record here establishes conclusively that at least a
'respectable minority' of physicians has 'accepted' marijuana as having a 'medi-
cal use in treatment in the United States.'111 The judge specied that the Act's
criterion was whether an accepted medical use did exist, rather than whether it
should exist, and thus concluded that this evidence should be dispositive.'2
Finally, the judge stated that DEA should not be guided by FDA-type cri-
teria in the case of marijuana, because marijuana is not a new drug (as it has
been in use for centuries) and because its ease of cultivation means that no
pharmaceutical company has incentive to invest the money in
109.I~ at 26.
at 27-29.
111l.~ at 29.
112~ at 32.
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35the testing necessary for FDA approval. The judge therefore held that the
Agency should not be inuenced by FDA'S recommendation, although he did
not account for the apparent contradiction between this suggestion to ignore
FDA, and the HHS authority delegated to FDA under 21 CFR, which DEA
was statutorily instructed to heed. Ignoring this seemingly implicit legislative
foreclosure of his suggestion, Judge Young focused on the normative rationale
for his suggestion, stating that:
Since the substance being considered in this case is a natural plant rather
than a synthetic new drug, it is unreasonable to make FDA-type criteria deter-
minative of the issue..., particularly so when such criteria are irrelevant to the
question posed by the Act: Does the substance have an accepted medical use
in treatment?113
Addressing this prescribed question, the judge held that marijuana clearly
had a currently accepted medical use, and that. [t]o conclude otherwise, on this
record, would be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.114
The judge also considered the evidence on marijuana's use in treating glau-
coma, spasticity resulting from such causes as multiple sclerosis, and hyper-
parathyroidism. Regarding glaucoma, Judge Young concluded that although
some opthamologists testied to the eectiveness of such treatment, the evidence
was insucient to establish that their position was accepted by a respectable
minority of physicians 115
113~ at 33|34.
114k at 34.
at 38|39.
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36116~ at 54.
117~
118l~. at 55.
However, the judge was persuaded that within the meaning of the Act, 21
U.S.C. 812 (b)(2)(B), marijuana 'has a currently accepted medical use in treat-
ment in the United States' for spasticity resulting from multiple sclerosis and
other causes.6 Judge Young held that enough evidence had been presented to
establish that a signicant minority of physicians do accept such treatment, and
he concluded that Nothing more can be reasonably required. That some doctors
would have more studies and test results in hand before accepting marijuana's
usefulness here is irrelevant.~7
Finally, Judge Young concluded that the evidence established an accepted
medical use for treatment of hyperparathyroidism, an extremely rare condition
resulting in bone spurs, great pain, and risk of cancer. Because of the rarity of
the disease, Judge Young concluded that acceptance by one doctor of marijuana
as being useful in treating it ought to satisfy the requirement for a signicant
minority. Young noted that the Agency had presented no evidence suggesting
that marijuana was not accepted in treating this extremely rare disease. Conse-
quently, Judge Young ruled that, as in the cases of chemotherapy and spasticity
treatments, refusal to recognize acceptance [of marijuana use in treating hyper-
parathyroidism] by a signicant minority.., would be unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious. 118
35
37The judge then addressed the second of the two questions slated for him:
whether there is a lack of accepted safety for use of marijuana under medical su-
pervision. Once again, the judge held that accepted meant actual acceptance by
the medical community (at least a signicant minority of it), and he found that
the Agency was in error to focus on scientic studies and on whether doctors
should accept such use. Thus, the judge asserted that the only proper question
for the Agency here is: aM~ a signicant minority of ohvsicians accented mari-
juana as safe for use under medical supervision?119 The record made clear, Judge
Young concluded, that such acceptance did indeed exist. Moreover, Young held
that this accepted safety of use extended to glaucoma treatment, even though
the judge did not nd that the use itself for that purpose was accepted. In ana-
lyzing the Agency's case against recognizing marijuana's accepted safety, Young
concluded that the Agency's argument amounted simply to an assertion that
more tests were needed. However, because the question was whether a signi-
cant minority did accept it, not whether they should, Young held that further
tests were unnecessary as the standard had already been met.lW
Following his armative answers to both questions set forth for him, Judge
Young concluded that the provisions of the Act permit and require the transfer
of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II. Young urged the Agency not to be
swayed from this objective analysis by the strong emotions
119~ at 65.
at 65-66.
36
38aroused by the subject of marijuana.121 He also found specious the argument
that rescheduling marijuana would 'send a signal' that marijuana is 'OK' gen-
erally for recreational use, and he urged that this misguided fear should not
prevent marijuana from being placed in the legally appropriate schedule. Judge
Young held that, because
marijuana has been accepted as capable of relieving the distress of great
numbers of very ill people, and doing so with safety under medical supervision...
[ilt would be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious for DEA to continue to
stand between those suerers and the benets of this substance in light of the
evidence of this record. 122
Consequently, Judge Young recommended that the Administrator transfer
marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule 11.123
But the DEA Administrator rejected Judge Young's recommended ruling
in December 1989, and thereby denied NORML's petition once again.124 In
rejecting NORML's petition, the DEA Administrator detailed why he perceived
Judge Young's conclusion to have been faulty. The DEA Administrator revisited
the evidence upon which Judge Young had relied, and challenged it as anecdotal
and unreliable.'~ Following his own review of the evidence, the Administrator
found that
there is insucient, and in many instances no, reliable, credible, scientic
evidence, supported by properly conducted scientic research, to support a con-
clusion that marijuana has a medical use to treat any ailment or disease. In
addition, there is a lack of scientic evidence to support a
121~ at 67.
122~ at 68.
123~
12454 Fed. Reg. 53767 (1989)
125~ at 53773.
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39conclusion that marijuana is safe for use under medical supervision. 126
The DEA Administrator claimed that Judge Young had failed to act as an
impartial judge, as he appears to have ignored the testimony of highly-credible
and recognized medical experts.'27 The DEA Administrator asserted that Judge
Young ignored any evidence presented by the Government, by relying entirely
on the physicians presented by the petitioners, and not once...mention[ing] the
Government's experts. 128
The DEA Administrator accused Judge Young of develop[ing] his own stan-
dard for both accepted medical use and accepted safety.129 The Administrator
rejected Judge Young's standard of a signicant or respectable minority as pre-
posterous because, as he stated, using the same criteria as medical malpractice
cases to determine a national standard of medical acceptance is untenable, since
the views of those few physicians and scientists [who deviate from the norm] are
not sucient to create a nding of national acceptance.130 In place of Judge
Young's standard, the DEA Administrator applied an eight-part test to deter-
mine if there was an accepted medical use for marijuana.13' The factors that it
set forth to determine medical acceptability were: (1) scientically determined
and accepted knowledge of
126~I.~ at 53772.
127~ at 53782.
128.I.~ at 53782-53783.
129~ at 53783.
130~ at 53784.
~ The Administrator had st developed this test of accepted
medical usage as a response to Grinspoon v. DEA, 828 F. 2d 881 (1987).
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40its chemistry; (2) the toxicology and pharmacology of the substance in animals;
(3) establishment of its eectiveness in humans through scientically designed
clinical trials; (4) general availability of the substance and information regard-
ing the substance and its use; (5) recognition of its clinical use in generally
accepted pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals or textbooks; (6) spe-
cic indications for the treatment of recognized disorders; (7) recognition of
the use of the substance by organizations or associations of physicians; and (8)
recognition and use of the substance by a substantial segment of the medical
practitioners in the United States. Based on this test, as applied to his review
of the evidence (discussed above), the Administrator concluded that, without
reliable scientic studies, there was insucient medical and scientic evidence to
support a conclusion that marijuana has an accepted medical use for treatment
of any condition, or that it is safe for use, even under medical supervision.'32
Consequently, the Administrator denied NORML's petition and ordered that
marijuana remain in Schedule 1.133
But the battle between DEA and NORML was far from over. By 1991, it
had come full circle once more, as NORML petitioned the court for review of
DEA's decision.'34 The D.C. Circuit held that the DEA Administrator was well
within his power to reject the administrative law judge's respectable
I 32~
133~
'~A11iance for cannabis Therapeutics and NORML v. DEA, 930 F. 2d 936
(D.C. cir. 1991)
39
41at 940.
minority standard. The court found appropriate the Administrator's reliance
on the lack of scientic evidence regarding marijuana. The court cited 21 USC
811 (c) (2) and
(3) in stating that Congress required the Administrator,
in
making scheduling determinations with respect to the drug, to consider the
'scientic evidence of [the drug's] pharmacological eect' and the 'state of cur-
rent scientic knowledge regarding the drug.' The court did not nd that the
administrative law judge's recommendation was wrong, but simply held that
the Administrator's rejection of it was acceptable, as the court concluded that
it was very much a policy judgment which we have no authority to challenge.'35
However, the court did adopt one of petitioners arguments, which ultimately
unraveled the court's acceptance of the Administrator's decision and led to a
remand for explanation. The court accepted NOEML's argument that three
of the eight factors in the Administrator's test might be impossible to satisfy
precisely because of the drug's Schedule I classication. Factors 4 (general
availability of the substance and information regarding the substance and its
use), 5 (recognition of its clinical use in generally accepted pharmacopoeia,
medical references, journals or textbooks) and 8 (recognition and use of the
substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United
States), all described circumstances which would only be legal for drugs in
Schedule II or higher, and thus the
40
42court questioned their validity for determining whether a Schedule I drug should
be in Schedule II. Because the court could not determine how strongly these
three factors had inuenced the Administrator's decision, the court remanded
the case for an explanation as to how all three of these factors were utilized by
the Administrator in reaching his decision. 136
In response to the court's remand, DEA issued a statement in 1994, once
again concluding the plant material marijuana has no currently accepted med-
ical use and denying the petition of NORML.137 The Administrator (successor
to the author of the 1989 decision which had been at issue in the 1991 D.C. Cir-
cuit case) based this statement on his own analysis of the evidence, concluding
that further hearings were unnecessary in light of such an extensive record. In
addressing the court's concern over the standards used by his predecessor, the
Administrator labeled marijuana bad medicine by any standard. He subdivided
the three factors concerning the Court as follows: (4) (a) general availabil-
ity of the substance, (4) (b) general availability of information regarding the
substance and its use, (5) recognition of its clinical use in generally accepted
pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals or textbooks, (8) (a) recognition
of the substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the
United States, and (8) (b) use of the
136~ at 940|941.
13757 Fed. Reg. 10499 (1994)
41
43substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United
States.
The Administrator's analysis ultimately presented a ve-part test to replace
the initial eight-part test, but this new test eliminated only factors (4) (a),
(5), and (8) (b). With regard to factor (4) (a), the Administrator accepted
the Court's position that requiring a material history of past use in treatment
before recognizing a drug as having a currently accepted medical use.., would
permanently freeze all Schedule I drugs into Schedule I,~138 and thus he rejected
this criterion. Likewise, he essentially eliminated factor (8) (b) as well, as he
proposed that factors (7) and (8) be combined and restated as requiring either
that the drug has an FDA-approved New Drug Application (NDA) or:
a consensus of the national community of experts, qualied by scientic
training and experience to evaluate the safety and eectiveness of drugs, ac-
cepts the safety and eectiveness of the substance for use in treating a specic,
recognized disorder. A material conict of opinion among experts precludes a
nding of consensus 139
This restated requirement eliminates the factor (8) (b) requirement of use..
by a substantial segment of medical practitioners in the United States. The
Administrator expressed certainty that factors 4(a) and 8(b) played no role in
the previous administrator's decision.'~
Regarding factor (5), the Administrator held that recognition in generally
accepted texts is irrelevant as
138~ at 10506.
139~ at 10505.
140~ at 10507.
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44long as information about the drug's chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology and
eectiveness are available as required by factors (1) and (4). Beyond those re-
quirements, the Administrator not only found factor (5) irrelevant, but he also
declared that to the extent the scheduling of a drug directly inuences its recog-
nition in publications, this element is subject to the same criticism identied by
the Court... concerning point four (i.e.: that it would freeze Schedule I drugs
in Schedule I]. Based on this, the Administrator held that factor (5) should not
be treated as a distinct requirement 141 Because his predecessor had explicitly
noted that factor (5) was not met, the Administrator could not dismiss it as
having played no role in his predecessor's decision, as he did with factors (4)
(a) and (8) (b). Instead, the Administrator viewed his predecessor's mention
of factor (5) through the lens of his own revised conception of its appropriate
scope. Thus, the Administrator interpreted his predecessor's noting that factor
(5) was not met, to mean only that his predecessor determined that marijuana's
chemistry is neither known, nor reproducible, as evidenced by its absence from
the ocial pharmacopoeia. 142
Regarding the remaining criterion in question, the Administrator stated that
the factor (4) (b) requirement of general availability of information should be
claried to read that:
141~ at 10506.
142~
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45Information concerning the chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology and eective-
ness of the substance must be reported, published, or otherwise widely available,
in sucient detail to permit experts, qualied by scientic training and experi-
ence to evaluate the safety and eectiveness of drugs, to fairly and responsibly
conclude the substance is safe and eective for use in treating a specic, recog-
nized disorder.'43
Essentially, this restatement of factor (4) (b) is a compilation of factors (1)
(knowledge of its chemistry), (2) (toxicology and pharmacology), (3) (eective-
ness), and (6) (indicated for the treatment of a specic, recognized disorder),
all of which had been upheld by the court.
Based on this analysis, the Administrator set forth a revised ve-factor test
to replace his predecessor's eight-factor test. As explained above, this test elim-
inated some of the factors that had troubled the court(4a, 5, and 8b), while
maintaining others (4b and 8a) with revised wordings and explanations of why
they met the court's concerns. The new ve-factor test specically dened the
basic requirements it set forth, providing as follows:
(1) The Drug's Chemistry Must Be Known and Reproducible (The
substance's chemistry must be scientically established to permit it to be re-
produced in dosages which can be standardized. The listing of the substance in
a current edition of one of the ocial compendia, as dened by section 201(j)
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC 321(f), is sucient generally to
meet this requirement.)
(2) There Must be Adequate Safety Studies (There must be adequate
pharmacological and toxicological studies done by all methods reasonably ap-
plicable on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded, by
experts qualied by scientic training and experience to evaluate the
143~
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46at 10507.
safety and eectiveness of drugs, that the substance is safe for treating a
specic, recognized disorder.)
(3) There Must Be Adequate and Well-Controlled Studies Proving
Ecacy (There must be adequate, well-controlled, well-designed, well-conducted
and well-documented studies, including clinical investigations, by experts quali-
es by scientic training and experience to evaluate the safety and eectiveness
of drugs on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded
by such experts, that the substance will have its intended eect in treating a
specic, recognized disorder.)
(4) The Drug Must Be Accepted by Qualied Experts
(The drug must have a New Drug Application (NDA) approved by the Food
and Drug Administration... Or, a consensus of the national community of ex-
perts, qualied by scientic training and experience to evaluate the safety and
eectiveness of drugs, accepts the safety and eectiveness of the substance for
use in treating a specic, recognized disorder. A material conict of opinion
among experts precludes a nding of consensus.)
(5) The Scientic Evidence Must Be Widely Available (In the absence of NDA
approval, information concerning the chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology and
eectiveness of the substance must be reported, published, or otherwise widely
available in sucient detail to permit experts, qualied by scientic training
and experience to evaluate the safety and eectiveness of drugs, to fairly and
responsibly conclude the substance is safe and eective for use in treating a
specic, recognized disorder.)
As stated previously, the Administrator expressed conviction that his prede-
cessor had not been inuenced by any of the factors that the present Adminis-
trator found inappropriate. However, the Administrator conceded that he could
not fully know his predecessor's unstated reasoning, and thus the Administrator
explained, I have reviewed the entire record de novo, and I am convinced that...
marijuana has no currently accepted medical treatment in the United States.'
45
47Referring to his revised criteria, the Administrator stated that a failure to meet
just one of the ve points precludes a drug from having a currently accepted
medical use, and he concluded that marijuana fails all ve points of the test.'45
Consequently, the Administrator ordered that marijuana remain in Schedule ~
For the rst time, in its 1994 opinion in Alliance for Cannabis TheraDeutics and NORME v. DEA,
the D.C. Circuit did not remand the Administrator's decision in response to pe-
titioners' appeal, but instead supported the Administrator's conclusions and
thereby gave them full force of law. The court refused to revisit the issue of
whether the Administrator's basic interpretation of the statute was reasonable,
based on the law of the case doctrine that made binding the court's ruling on
that issue in the 1991 case.147 The court rejected petitioners' contention that
the court had not given adequate attention to the statutory interpretation issue
previously, and asserted that, regardless, even summarily treated issues become
the law of the case. Thus, the court reiterated its previously stated position on
the statutory interpretation issue, that it was not 'an unreasonable application
of the statutory phrase [for the
~45~
'~l~ at 10508.
t47Alliance for cannabis Therateutics and NORML v. DEA, 15 F. 3d 1131,
1134 (D.c. cir. 1994. The court explains that the law of the case doctrine dic-
tates that barring exceptional circumstances, appellate courts do not reconsider
matters resolved on a prior appeal in the same proceeding, citing 18 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure x
4478 (1981)
46
48Administrator] to emphasize the lack of exact scientic knowledge as to the
chemical eects of the drug's elements. '~
Consequently, the court focused on the Administrator's response to the issue
on which it had remanded: the three questionable factors. The court accepted
the Administrator's conclusion that his predecessor's decision had not been
based on those criteria that a Schedule I drug would be barred from meeting
precisely because of its scheduling. The court also found acceptable the new
ve-factor test presented by the Administrator, as it concluded that none of
these criteria is impossible for a Schedule I drug to meet.'49
Finally, the court also rejected wholesale the petitioners' two additional
claims, which had not been part of the court's 1991 opinion. Petitioners claimed
that the previous Administrator had violated the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) by not disclosing his eight-factor test in time for petitioners to conform
their evidentiary submissions to it, and that the Administrator did not engage in
reasoned decisionmaking because he was biased and ignored the record. Regard-
ing the FOIA claim, petitioners claimed that the Administrator had violated
section 552 (a) (1) of FOIA, which requires agencies to set out in advance the
legal standards that will be applied so that parties may
~Alliance for cannabis Theraneutics and NORML v. DEA, 15 F. 3d at 1135,
citing Alliance for cannabis Therapeutics and NORNL v. DEA, 930 F. 2d
at
939.
'49Alliance for cannabis Theraneutics and NORML v. DEA, 15 F. 3d at 1135.
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49plan and act accordingly.'5 Although the Administrator had not published the
eight-factor test until 17 days after the close of evidence, the court held that he
had not violated FOIA, because in order to establish a claim under the statute...
the litigant must show that 'he was adversely aected by a lack of publication
or that he would have been able to pursue an alternative course of conduct'
had the information been published.15' The court concluded that petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that they have in fact been adversely aected by the
lack of notice, and thus the court denied petitioners' request that the case be
remanded to the Administrator with instructions that he reopen the record for
new evidence. The court based its conclusion on the fact that during the nearly
two years between the publication of the eight-factor test on February 22, 1988,
and the Administrator's ruling on December 29, 1989, petitioners never sought
to reopen the record. The court found this to suggest that either petitioners
were satised with the evidence in light of the new test, or that they had no
additional evidence to oer. Consequently, the court concluded, we have no
reason to believe that petitioners would have pursued an 'alternative course of
conduct' had the test been published earlier.'52
150.I.~. at 1136, citing 5 usc x 552(a) (1).
151d. citing Zaharakis v. Heckler, 744 F. 2d 711, 714 (9th cir. 1984).
It is puzzling that in setting forth this adversely aected limitation on FOIA
violations, which proves pivotal for the issue here, the court cites as its only sup-
port a case from the Ninth circuit. 152~~ at 1136, citing Zaharakis v. Heckler,
744 F. 2d at 714.
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50In responding to petitioners' reasoned decisionmaking claim, the court conned
its analysis to the current Administrator, since the court had already remanded
the issue of the previous Administrator's decisionmaking to the agency. The
court held that the need to remand a case several times is not evidence per se
of agency prejudice. Further, the court found reasonable the Administrator's
preference for rigorous scientic proof over anecdotal evidence, even when re-
ported by respected physicians, as such was consistent with the reasonable view
that only rigorous scientic proof can satisfy the CSA's [Controlled Substances
Act's] 'currently accepted medical use' requirement.153 In addressing the record
itself, the court concluded that the Administrator's ndings are supported by
substantial evidence, as required by 21 U.S.C. 877.'~~ The court held that it
was reasonable for the Administrator to accord more weight to the opinions of...
experts than to the anecdotal testimony of laymen and doctors on which peti-
tioners relied, Concluding that the Administrator's decision was not biased, and
that it met the substantial evidence standard, the court denied all of petitioners
claims, fully upheld the Administrator's decision and, for the rst time, did not
remand any part of it for further consideration.'55
'53Alliance for cannabis Theraneutics and NORML v. DEA, 15 F. 3d at 1137.
~ citing 21 usc x 877 (1988), which states that the substantial evidence
standard applies to ndings of fact in rescheduling proceedings.
155Alliance for cannabis Theraneutics and NORML v. DEA, 15 F. 3d at 1137.
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51With this nal chapter, NORML apparently exhausted its options for recourse
under the Act's own provisions. However, the group has not accepted defeat;
it has merely moved the battle to alternative fronts, where it has joined other
individuals and groups also engaged in the struggle for medical marijuana use.
Part III of this essay surveys the other avenues to change which NORNI~ and
others are pursuing, as alternatives to the statutorily prescribed path.
Part Three:
Beyond Statutorily Prescribed Channels:
Alternatives Avenues to Reform
Proponents of legalizing medical marijuana use have also sought their objective
though channels other than the statutorily prescribed means of rulemaking pe-
titions and judicial review. These alternative eorts at changing the laws have
met with varying degrees of success, and many of them continue today. This
discussion reviews the areas in which such initiatives have been launched, and
addresses their evolving eectiveness from inception to the present. The rst
such alternative initiative involves the FDA Investigational New Drug (IND)
program, which began supplying marijuana to a handful of ailing individuals in
the 1970s. Because the Bush administration stopped accepting new patients to
this project and the Clinton administration preserved this status, however, the
only remaining
50
52beneciaries of this project are the eight individuals who were grandfathered
into the program.
Next, this essay reviews state initiatives that have been undertaken towards
allowing medical marijuana usage. In the judicial arena, some state courts have
ruled that medical necessity is a valid defense against marijuana possession
charges, thereby eectively legalizing medical marijuana usage within their bor-
ders. However, supply problems and the threat of prosecution remain even with
such a defense, and thus some of these states as well as others have taken action
in their state legislatures towards legalization of medical usage. These legisla-
tive actions range from non-binding statutory resolutions encouraging federal
acceptance of medical marijuana, to substantive provisions legalizing its use.
Finally, proponents are presently working towards the alternative of federal
legislative action. A bill currently before Congress proposes to legalize medical
marijuana use under federal regulatory authority. The forthcoming discussion
addresses the history and eects of the initiatives in each of the aforementioned
areas.'~ This review not only illuminates the situation surrounding medical
1565ome have suggested that additional scientic study on the ecacy of
medical marijuana would further bolster proponents' eorts towards legaliza-
tion, and there is some evidence that the government has not been supportive
of such research initiatives. However, the issue of scientic knowledge and re-
search on marijuana is beyond the scope of this essay, which addresses reform
initiatives in the legal and political arenas. Telephone interview with Mark
Kleiman, Associate Professor of Public Policy, Kennedy school of Government,
Harvard university (March 27, 1996).
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53marijuana use in particular, but also presents the range of options available to
groups and individuals seeking change in the laws on other administrative issues
and meeting with frustration along the legislatively prescribed channels.
Medical Marijuana AcCeUB through the
Federal Investigational New Drug Program
The federal supplying of medical marijuana through the FDA IND program, an
initiative which currently provides eight people with the drug, began in 1978, as
part of a settlement from a lawsuit led against the government by medical user
Robert Randall.157 Randall's legal action against the government followed his
acquittal on marijuana possession charges in 1976, on the grounds of medical
necessity.'58 Randall was diagnosed with glaucoma in the early 1970s, and was
told by doctors that he would be blind within a few years.159 He discovered
that marijuana eased the pressure on his eyes, and consequently he began using
it daily. In August of 1975, Randall was arrested for marijuana possession.
He underwent a battery of tests by independent researchers, which concluded
that he would go blind without the drug.1W Bolstered by such strong medical
testimony,
'57Randall v. u.s. (1978), discussed in Adavit of Robert c. Randall, May
20, 1987, .in Marijuana. Medicine and the Law 27-28 (R.c. Randall, ed., 1988).
See ~ 60 Minutes: Smoking to Live (CBS News Television Broadcast, December
1, 1991). Eugene L. Meyer, uncle Sam's Aunt Mary; In Which We Pay a visit
to a Far-Out Place: The u.s. Government Pot
Plantation, The Washington Post, October 22, 1995, at FOl. 158united States v. Randall.
No. 65923-75 (D.c. Super. ct. led Nov. 24, 1976), reported in The Daily Washington Law ReDorter,
vol. 104, Dec.
28, 1976, 2239|2254.
'59u.s. v. Randall, The Daily Washington Law ReDorter, vol. 104, at 2249.
~ L~A T.im~, Oct. 22, 1995.
I6OTJg v. Randall, The Daily Washington Law Renorter, vol. 104 at 2249.
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54Randall was acquitted in 1976, on grounds of medical necessity. 161
The R~n~IJ. court identied the case as one of rst impression, and reached
its conclusion through an analysis of the common law defense of necessity. The
court recognized that the common law necessity doctrine justied or excused
conduct that the actor did not have a free choice in taking due to extraordinarily
compelling circumstances. The court noted, however, that the necessity defense
is not available under such circumstances if any of the following limitations
exists: (1) The actor caused the compelling circumstances leading to his/her
action; (2) The same objective could have been met through a less oensive
alternative available to the actor; ~r (3) The harm avoided was less heinous
than the actor's conduct to avoid it.'62
The court applied these criteria to Randall's case, and concluded that Ran-
dall's glaucoma was a suciently compelling circumstance to excuse his mar-
ijuana use in accordance with the necessity defense, since conventional medi-
cations and surgery oer little hope of improvement [and] ... the inhalation of
marijuana smoke has a benecial eect on his condition. Further, the court held
that Randall's use did not fall within the three common law limitations on the
defense, because Randall did not cause his glaucoma, he had no equally eective
alternative to marijuana, and the court concluded that the harm to society
at 2254.
162~ at 2252.
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55of allowing such use was less than the benet to Randall. In discussing the
latter of these three factors, the court analogized the case at bar to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,163 as both cases weighed the right
of an individual to protect his body... against the interest of the government in
guarding the health and morals of the general public.'~ The court stated that
.~ and other cases revealed how far-reaching is the right of an individual to
preserve his health and bodily integrity. On this basis, the court concluded that
the evil he [Randall] sought to avert, blindness, is greater than that he performed
to accomplish it, growing marijuana in his residence.165 Thus, the court found
that Randall's circumstances fullled the necessity defense, and that he did not
t into any of the three limitations on its availability. Consequently, the court
held that defendant Robert C. Randall has established the defense of necessity,
and found him not guilty.'~
The court's application of the necessity defense to medical marijuana use was
the rst such judicial holding, and it led Randall to seek further recognition of
his medical marijuana needs. Following his acquittal, Randall led suit against
the federal government.'67 The lawsuit settled out of court in 1978, with Randall
becoming the rst marijuana
63Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
'~u.s. v. Randall, The Daily Washington Law Renorter, vol 104, at 2253. at
2253.
at 2254.
'67Randall v. u.s. (1978), discussed in Adavit of Robert c. Randall,
May 20, 1987, in Mariluana. Medicine and the Law, ~ note 157, at
27-
28.
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56recipient under the FDA IND program.'~ The IND program exists under section
505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which enables the FDA
to authorize limited use of drugs that are not yet fully tested.1 ~ In Randall's
case, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), a subsidiary to the Public
Health Service, was the applicant for the IND, which FDA authorized.170
NIDA already had a legal supply of marijuana from which it was able to
supply Randall. Under a research contract with the University of Mississippi's
Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences, NIDA funded a project that grew
marijuana in order to conduct research on its chemistry. This project, called the
M-Project, began in 1968 when pharmaceutical researcher Dr. Coy Waller won
a contract from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) to establish
the program at the University of Mississippi.17' Following Congressional passage
of the 1972 Act creating NIDA as a subsidiary body within NIMH,72 authority
over the M-Project was delegated to NIDA.173 When Congress removed NIDA
from NIMH's authority and placed it under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse,
1 ~Telephone interview with Don Mcclearn, Deputy Associate commissioner
for Public Aairs at the FDA (March 22, 1996). According to Mcclearn, all
IND les are condential, so Randall's le number cannot be released publicly.
~.
'69The Federal Food, Drug, and cosmetic Act of 1938 x 505(i), 21 usc x355(i)
(1994).
170Telephone interview with cheryl Messera, Press Ocer at NIDA (April
10, 1996). Telephone interview with Don Mcclearn, ~ note 168.
As
mentioned above, Mcclearn stated that all IND les are condential and that
therefore Randall's le number cannot be released publicly.
171Telephone interview with Dr. coy Waller, Founder of the M-Project (April
10, 1996)
'72The Drug Abuse Oce and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-255, x501,
86 Stat. 65, 85 (1972).
'73Telephone interview with cheryl Messera ~ note 170.
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57and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) two years later,'74 NIDA main-
tained control over the M-Project.175 The project remains under contract with
NIDA today, and in addition to providing a limited amount of medical mari-
juana, it also continues to function in a law-enforcement capacity by analyzing
the content of suspected marijuana for police departments nationwide.176
From this M-Project, NIDA began supplying Randall with marijuana in
1978, pursuant to FDA's authorization.177 Randall's situation set a medical-use
precedent which many other individuals sought to follow. However, the process
for a doctor to enroll a patient in the program was quite time-consuming, requir-
ing approximately 50 hours of paperwork according to one doctor's calculation.'7
Towards the end of the 1980s, with the spread of the AIDS virus, a strong in-
terest in medical use of marijuana for treatment of the AIDS wasting syndrome
emerged.'79 In response, Randall
'74comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment,
and Rehabilitation Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. 93-282, x 204, 88 Stat.
125, 136 (1974)
175Telephone interview with cheryl Messera, su~ra note 170.
76Meyer, ~ note 157, at FOl.
177Telephone interview with cheryl Messera, ~ note 170. Telephone interview
with Don Mcclearn, supra note 168. As mentioned above, Mcclearn stated that
all IND les are condential and that consequently Randall's le number cannot
be released publicly. '78Richard Paddock, Is smoking Pot Good Medicine?,
Los Anceles Times, February 26, 1995, at Al. See ~ Statement by u.s. Public
Health service, March 6, 1992 (on le with the DHHS Press Oce). According
to this statement, in addition to seeking access to the IND program, physicians
were required to comply with a rigorous DEA registration process.
179Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Mariluana. The Forbidden Medicine 85-91 (1993).
~ Lester Grinspoon, Marijuana as Medicine: A Plea for Reconsideration, 273
Journal of the American Medical Association 1875
(1995). The AIDS wasting syndrome involves is caused by the progress ap-
petite loss and nausea that often aict AIDS patients, causing them to become
dangerously underweight..L~.
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58assembled a how-to-apply kit, which he released to AIDS groups to facilitate
patients' access to the federal program.'80 Applications by AIDS patients to the
program rose dramatically, leading the Public Health Service (PHS) under the
Bush administration'8' to close the program. Assistant Secretary for Health
James Mason, M.D., who headed PBS, put the program on hold in June 1991
in order to assess it. The nal PBS decision to close the program was issued on
March 6, 1992. From that point on, no new patients were admitted, but
NIDA continued to supply marijuana to the thirteen medical users already in
the program.'82 Of those thirteen, ve have subsequently died of AIDS. Randall,
however, continues to receive his supply of marijuana from NIDA, and contrary
to doctors' projections that he would be blind by the mid-1970s, he still has his
eyesight.'83
The Clinton administration considered lifting the ban in 1994, but decided
against doing so.'~ Philip Lee, Assistant Secretary for Health under the Clinton
Administration, explained that
180Meyer, ~ note 157, at FOl.
181During the Bush Administration, the Public Health Service of DHHS had
authority over FDA and over ADAMHA. As mentioned above, NIDA was an
entity within ADAMHA. Statement by the U.S. Public Health Service, sunra
note 178.
'82Statement by the U.S. Public Health Service, ~ note 178. See also John Bow-
ersox, PHS cancels Availability of Medicinal Marijuana, 84 Journal of the National cancer Institute
475 (1992).
'83Paddock, ~ note 178, at Al.
'~Letter from Philip Lee, Assistant Secretary for Health, to u.s. Representa-
tive Dan Hamburg (July 21, 1994) (on le at the DHHS Press Oce). See
~ Rebecca Voelker, Medical Marijuana: A Trial of Science and Politics, 271
Journal of the American Medical Association
1645 (1994).
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59In considering whether to reopen the single patient IND process [for marijuana]
we have carefully evaluated the current state of knowledge about therapeu-
tic marijuana. This evaluation indicated that sound scientic studies support-
ing these claims are lacking despite anecdotal claims that smoked marijuana is
benecial.'85
Consequently, Lee stated, the Public Health Service under
Clinton will not reopen the single patient Investigational
New Drug program for marijuana.186
State Common Law:
Reception of the Medical Necessity Defense
The Washington, D.C. Superior Court's acceptance of the medical necessity
defense in Randall, discussed above, led to similar decisions in state courts
across the country. Indeed, in those states which have accepted it, the medical
necessity defense has provided an important bypass around the rules against
medical marijuana use. However, some states' courts that have considered the
question have ruled that no such defense is available to the charge of marijuana
possession. Finally, many states' courts have not yet confronted the issue, simply
because cases in which a defense of necessity would likely be raised are seldom
prosecuted.'87
'85Letter from Philip Lee to Dan Hamburg, ~3J note 184. 1 ~Id.
'87Arnolds and Garland, The Defense of Necessity in criminal Law: The
Right to choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. crim. L. & criminology 289, 290 (1974)
(discussing the paucity of cases nationwide involving the necessity defense in
general, and stating that this is probably because these cases are not often
prosecuted.)
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60Following is a discussion of the positions taken by those states that have con-
sidered the issue.
Three years after the Washington, D.C., trial court decision in B.~n~1i,
the Washington State Court of Appeals also ruled that medical necessity is an
armative defense to the charge of marijuana possession, in its 1979 opinion in
Washinaton v. Diana.188 In so doing, the Washington Court of Appeals became
the rst state appellate court to adopt the medical marijuana necessity defense
as common law. The defendant, Samuel Diana, had been convicted in state trial
court of marijuana possession, and appealed his conviction on several grounds.'89
Of Diana's contentions, the appellate court accepted only the claim that he
should have been given an opportunity to present evidence supporting a medical
necessity defense to his marijuana possession charges. The court remanded the
case on that basis, holding that if Diana could prove the elements the court
set forth for medical necessity (as discussed below) his conviction should be
reversed. 190
Defendant Diana had been arrested in 1977, on charges of marijuana posses-
sion. At his initial trial, Diana testied that he suered from multiple sclerosis,
and that he used marijuana to ease his symptoms. However, Diana did not try
'88State of Washington v. Samuel Diana, 604 P. 2d 1312 (1979). '89The
other grounds for defendant's appeal, which are unrelated to the topic of this
essay, involved the spousal privilege against testifying and the knock-and-wait
rule of entering a home. The appellate court rejected Diana's claims on both of
these issues, and accepted only Diana's contention that he should be permitted
to present evidence supporting a medical necessity defense. I~.
'90;~.
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61to mount a defense of medical necessity based on this information, and conse-
quently, the trial judge, who sat as the trier of fact, did not enter a nding on
this point.'9' On appeal, Diana sought to raise a defense of medical necessity,
based on three factors: (1) his experience of symptom relief through marijuana
was supported by current medical research; (2) the drugs his doctors legally
prescribed were not as eective as marijuana at relieving his symptoms, and
they had unpleasant side eects; and (3) he tried to obtain marijuana legally
through his physicians, and they refused his request solely on the basis of the
drug's illegality.'~
The prosecution argued against Diana's introducing this new defense at the
appellate level, citing the general rule that an appellate court will not consider
arguments that have not rst been presented to the trial court.~93 However,
the appellate court determined that the circumstances of this case justied an
exception to this general rule, based on appellate courts' discretion to take any
action required by the merits of the case and the interests of justice.'94 The
court noted that information on the potential therapeutic use of marijuana had
been widely publicized in the short interim since Diana's trial, leading the court
to the
191~ at 1315.
1921d.
194j~. at 1315 n.3, citing Rules of Appellate Procedure 12.2 that The appel-
late court may reverse, arm, or modify the decision being reviewed and take
any other action as the merits of the case and the interest of justice may require.
60
62conclusion that justice requires that we consider defendant 's argument. 195
The court reviewed the elements of the general necessity defense,'96 as fol-
lows:
Generally, necessity is available as a defense when the physical forces of
nature or the pressure of nature or the pressure of circumstances cause the
accused to take unlawful action to avoid a harm which social policy deems
greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law.197
The court also noted that the defense is not applicable where the compelling
circumstances have been brought about by the accused or where a legal alter-
native is available to the accused. 's198
The court acknowledged that the medical necessity defense was not com-
monly applied to marijuana use, and that the ~n~1i case was the only precedent
for the ~ decision. The court praised the ~n~2J. court's approach in balancing
the defendant's interest in preserving his sight against the government's interest
in controlling the drug, and approved of the opinion's placing special emphasis...
upon the importance of an individual's right to preserve and protect his own
body.'99 After reviewing the general necessity defense and the D.C. Superior
Court's application of that defense to medical marijuana use in B~n~li. the
195~ at 1316.
'~The court's logic in setting forth the medical necessity defense, by
grounding it in the general necessity defense, essentially parallels the
D.C. Superior court's reasoning in ~
'97state v. Diana, 604 P. 2d at 1316.
198~ at 1316.
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63200~ at 1317.
20I~
Washington Court of Appeals concluded that Diana should be given the op-
portunity to present such a medical necessity defense to the charge of marijuana
possession. The court instructed the trial court, on remand, to conclude that
the elements of such a defense would be satised if the court found that:
(1) the defendant reasonably believed his use of marijuana was necessary to
minimize the eects of multiple sclerosis; (2) the benets derived from its use
are greater than the harm sought to be prevented by the controlled substances
law; and (3) no drug is as eective in minimizing the eects of the disease.200
The court specied that corroborating medical testimony would be necessary
to support the defendant's assertions that marijuana use was necessary for his
health.
The court further noted that, on remand, the defendant would bear the
burden of proving the existence of medical necessity, an armative defense,
by a preponderance of the evidence. The opinion instructed the lower court
that, if that burden were met, the conviction should be set aside. Finally, the
court underscored the narrowly circumscribed nature of the defense which it was
setting forth in its Diana opinion. The court emphasized that medical necessity,
as a defense to possession, exists only under very limited circumstances not
present in the routine case involving controlled substances.inaWl On retrial,
Diana presented his case with strong corroborating medical evidence, and the
62
64trial court found him not guilty by reason of medical necessity.202
The ~ opinion remains the controlling decision on the medical necessity de-
fense to marijuana possession charges in Washington state.203 Although cases
invoking the medical necessity defense come to trial relatively infrequently, prob-
ably because prosecutors often drop the charges against defendants who are
medical users,~ the Washington Court of Appeals has maintained the position
it took in j~n~. As recently as 1994, the court rearmed that position, in
Washington v. Cole.205
This case of Washington v. Cole reached the Washington Court of Appeals
on the issue of the trial court's granting a prosecutorial motion in limine, to bar
Cole from presenting evidence at trial in support of a medical necessity defense
to the charge of marijuana possession.206 Cole sought to introduce medical tes-
timony regarding the back spasms that he had suered regularly since his severe
injury in a 1987 logging accident. The state led a motion in limine to preclude
this medical testimony as well as the entire medical necessity defense. At the
hearing on the motion, Cole presented an adavit from an orthopedic surgeon
regarding
2 ~5tate v. Diana, No. 25230, Doc. 62 (Wash. Superior ct., Spokane cty.,
March 4, 1981)
~ Washington v. Palmer, 637 P. 2d 239 (1981) at 240 n.l,
citing ~ for the existence of the medical necessity defense. ~
~ Washington v. cole, 874 P. 2d 878 (1994) discussed in the text of
this essay.
204 ~g~ Arnolds and Garland, ~ note 187.
205State v. cole, 874 P. 2d 878 (1994)
206~ at 880|881.
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65207~
208~ at 881.
209~ at 882.
his condition. Cole also testied to his own condition, identifying ve doctors
whom he had seen for his back pain, and noting that records of his treatment
existed at the Virginia Mason Pain Clinic. Cole further testied about the pain
medications prescribed to him by his doctors, and described the incapacitating
side eects of those drugs. He explained that marijuana relieved the muscular
tension and nausea that he experienced without those side eects. Cole also
testied that he tried to obtain marijuana legally, but that he was unsuccessful.
He explained that he chose marijuana out of desperation, because when you're
in that much pain, you'll do anything to get rid of the pain.2c3 ~
The trial court questioned the credibility of the medical history and other
evidence presented by Cole, and granted the State's motion, subject to recon-
sideration if Cole presented additional information. Cole submitted additional
evidence on two separate occasions, in the form of letters by doctors whom Cole
had consulted during his treatment. However, the court found that the evidence
remained inadequate, and consequently it would not reconsider its ruling on the
State's motion.208 Because he could not present his medical necessity defense,
Cole waived his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty as charged.209
Cole appealed, contending that the trial court erred in not giving him the
opportunity to present his medical
64
66necessity defense to the jury. The Court of Appeals stated that the function
of a motion in limine is the prevention of potentially prejudicial evidence being
placed before the jury, until the trial court has ruled upon its admissibility
within the full context of the trial itself.210 The trial court had accepted the
State's contention that Cole had not produced sucient evidence to support
a necessity defense, and that the evidence would serve no purpose but that of
prejudicing the trier of fact.
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that a challenge to the suciency
of evidence requires the trial and appellate courts to interpret the evidence
most favorably to the defendant.21' While the appellate court acknowledged
that an issue would be appropriately withdrawn if only a scintilla of evidence
were presented in its support, it concluded that such was not the case at hand,
as Cole presented some evidence to satisfy each element of the three-pronged ~
test. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Cole should have been allowed
to present his medical necessity defense to a jury.212 On this basis, the court
remanded the case, underscoring the continuing applicability of the medical
necessity defense to marijuana possession charges, by stating in conclusion that
as noted in j~n~, Cole's interest in preserving his health must be balanced
against the State's interest in regulating the drug involved.213
210~
211~ at 882.
212~ at 883.
213~
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67Although the trial court on remand found that Cole did not present enough
evidence to satisfy the necessity defense,2'4 the appellate court's rearmation of
the ~ opinion nonetheless establishes the continuing applicability of the medical
necessity defense to marijuana possession charges in Washington state.
In 1991, the Florida Court of Appeal followed this lead, and also accepted
medical necessity as an armative defense to possession of marijuana. In
Jenks v. Florida,215 the Florida Court of Appeal reversed a trial court convic-
tion of Kenneth and Barbara Jenks, a husband and wife who were both suering
from AIDS, who used marijuana to treat the symptoms of their illness.216 As a
result of the AIDS virus and the side eects of its treatment, both Kenneth and
Barbara Jenks were consistently nauseated and rapidly losing weight, causing
substantial additional risks to their health. Based on a recommendation which
they received in an AIDS support group, the Jenks tried marijuana for the rst
time, and found that they were able to retain their AIDS medications, eat, gain
weight, maintain their health, and stay out of the hospital.217 The couple tried
to obtain marijuana legally through their physician, but were told that the drug
could not be prescribed. Consequently, the Jenks decided to grow two plants,
in order to have a ready supply of marijuana and
214State v. cole, No. 90-1-00078-3 (Wash. Superior ct. Jeerson cty.,
April 28, 1995). Defendant cole was found guilty of possession. j~.
2t5Jenks v. Florida, 582 So. 2d 676 (1991).
216Kenneth Jenks was infected with AIDS by a blood transfusion in 1980,
and he unknowingly passed it to his wife. Id. at 677.
217~
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68to avoid the need to buy it on the streets. The Jenks were arrested in March
1990, and readily admitted to police ocers that they both had AIDS and used
marijuana to relieve their symptoms.218
The Jenks waived their rights to jury trial, and agreed that the bench trial
should focus on their medical necessity defense.219 Because the Jenks' physician
was unavailable to testify, the parties stipulated to his testimony. The testimony
essentially stated as follows: (1) the physician was unable to nd any eective
drug for treating the patients' nausea, (2) the nausea was so debilitating that it
could cause the defendants' death, (3) he would prescribe marijuana as a drug
to control the nausea if he legally could, (4) marijuana is the only drug that
controlled the patients' nausea, and (5) he was seeking legal access to marijuana
for the Jenks through the FDA IND programA0 The Jenks also presented testi-
mony by two other expert witnesses on the general subject of the eectiveness
of marijuana as medicine.
The trial court rejected the medical necessity defense in general, holding that
no such defense existed in Florida.221 Consequently, the court found the Jenks
guilty as charged. In a showing of sympathy for the couple's plight, however,
the judge placed the Jenks on one year of unsupervised probation. During this
interval, the judge ordered the
218~
219~
220~ at 678.
221Jenks v. State, 15 F.L.W. D1070 (1991)
67
69couple to perform 500 hours of community service, which were to be discharged
only by providing care, comfort and concern for each other.~2
However, the Jenks nonetheless decided to appeal the conviction, as they did
not believe that they should be considered criminals for what they had done. As
the Jenks' attorney John Daniel recalls the decision to appeal, he remembers the
Jenks' saying, We're going to be gone soon. There's going to be people following
in our footprints and in our pain and suering, and there needs to be some law
made one way or the other on it.~3 The Florida Court of Appeals accepted
the Jenks defense, and stated that the medical necessity defense is merely a
more particular application of the necessity defense.~4 Although the Florida
legislature had never explicitly accepted the necessity defense, the court stated
that it had been recognized at common law, and... there has been no clearly
expressed legislative rejection of such defense.~ The court cited cases dating
back to sixteenth-century England supporting the doctrine, and concluded that
Florida had eectively adopted the necessity defense pursuant to Section 2.01 of
the Florida Statutes, which applied to Florida the general provisions of English
common law.2 ~The court held that Florida's statutory
2 ~Jenks v. Florida, 582 So. 2d at 678.
22360 Minutes: Smoking to Live, ~ note 157.
224Jenks v. Florida, 582 So. 2d at 679.
225Id at 678.
2261d. citing Florida Statutes x 2.01 (1989), which provides:
The common and statue laws of England which are of a general and not
a local nature... are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said
statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the
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70scheduling of marijuana as a Schedule I substance, the equivalent of marijuana's
federal categorization in Schedule I, did not preclude the defense of medical
necessity for marijuana use, as the court stated that it is well-established that a
statute should not be construed as abrogating the common law unless it speaks
unequivocally, and should not be construed to displace the common law more
than is necessary. 227
Finally, the court held that the Jenks had suciently established the ele-
ments of the necessity defense. The court reasoned that the Jenks did not in-
tentionally cause their illness, that they could not achieve the same eectiveness
using a drug other than marijuana, and that the evil incurred by their marijuana
use was far less than that which would be caused by the life-threatening nausea
and weight loss that they would experience without the drug. Consequently, the
appellate court held that The trial court erred in rejecting the Jenks' defense and
in convicting them.228 Although given opportunity, the Florida Supreme Court
did not overturn this decisionA29 and it thereby allowed medical necessity to
remain a valid defense to marijuana possession charges in the state.
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted essentially the same position in Idaho v. Hastings.230
However, the doctrine has not been implemented in Idaho as it was in the Florida
because
constitution and laws of the united States and the acts of the
Legislature in this state.
227Jenks v. Florida, 582 So. 2d at 679.
228~
2295tate v. Jenks, 589 So. 2d 292 (1991).
2305tate v. Hastings, 801 P. 2d 563 (1990)
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71the charges against Hastings were dropped following the Idaho Supreme Court's
remand for consideration of the necessity defense.231 The case involved a de-
fendant, Lynne Hastings, who used marijuana to control the pain and muscle
spasms caused by her aiction with rheumatoid arthritis. She was arrested for
possession of marijuana, and she sought to present a defense of medical necessity
based on her reasons for using marijuana. The trial judge refused to instruct
the jury on such a defense, as he held that medical necessity was not a valid
defense in the state of Idaho.232 However, he did allow defense counsel to create
a factual record on the issue, consisting of led adavits from experts and po-
tential witnesses, for purposes of future appeal. Hastings then pled guilty, and
immediately sought appellate review regarding the medical necessity defense2~3
The case was then transferred to the Supreme Court of Idaho.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated that it was not inclined to take this op-
portunity to create a special defense of medical necessity, but that it did believe
that defendant's circumstances fell suciently within the parameters of the gen-
eral necessity defense that she was entitled to introduce evidence relating to the
common law defense of necessity at the trial.234 The court referred to the lengthy
common law history of the necessity defense, beginning with the English courts'
position that a man may break the words of the law,
231State v. Hastines, cR 89-56720 (Idaho Superior ct., Kootenai cty).
232State v. Hastings, 801 P. 2d at 564.
233~
234~
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72and yet not break the law itself... where the words of them are broken to avoid
greater inconvenience, or through necessity, or by compulsion.235 The court
reasoned that Idaho had accepted this necessity defense, based on the provision
of the Idaho Code adopting English common law as follows:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for
in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.236
The court also cited recent cases, in Idaho and other states, in which courts
recognized necessity as an armative defense to such charges as drunk driving,
speeding, burglary, assault, escaping from prison, and kidnappingA7 The court
concluded that Lynn Hastings is entitled to present evidence at trial on the
common law defense of necessity, and stated that it is for the trier of fact to
determine whether she satised that defense3~8 However, the case was never re-
tried, because the prosecutor dropped the charges following this Idaho Supreme
Court decision3~9 Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in ~Z.jng.~
establishes in that state a common law right for medical marijuana users to
mount a necessity defense to charges against them.
Of the states that have had medical marijuana uses brought to trial, a num-
ber of states have rejected the
235j~., citing the English case Renincer v. Faroossa, 1 Plowd. 1, 75 Eng.
Rep. 1 (1551).
236State v. Hastings, 801 P. 2d at 565, citing Idaho code x 73-116.
237State v. Hastings, 801 P. 2d at 564.
238~ at 565.
2395tate v. Hastings, cR 89-56720 (Idaho Superior ct., Kootenai Cty).
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73possibilities of either recognizing a medical necessity defense or applying the
general necessity defense. These state court decisions are reviewed below.
In the New Jersey case of State v. Tate, the state supreme court overturned
rulings by the trial and appellate courts that allowed a defendant to present a
defense of medical necessity, and the state supreme court held that the defen-
dant would not be permitted such a defense.2 ~The issue arose at the trial court
level, following defendant Michael Tate's intention to assert a defense of medical
necessity to the charge of unlawful marijuana possession. Tate, a quadriplegic,
alleged that he used marijuana because it eased the pain of the spastic con-
tractions to which his body was regularly subject. He further claimed that no
other medication gave him equal relief Y~ The State moved for a pretrial reso-
lution that as a matter of law, 'medical necessity' is not a cognizable defense to
this criminal charge.242 The trial judge cited the general doctrine of necessity,
noting its explicit adoption by New Jersey in the New Jersey Code of Crimi-
nal Justice.243 The judge reviewed the applicability of the doctrine to a variety
of circumstances, and nally discussed the emergence from the general neces-
sity doctrine of the medical marijuana necessity defense in U.S. v. Randall and
State v. Diana.2 The trial court
2'~5tate v. Tate, 505 A. 2d 941 (1986).
24tState v. Tate, 477 A. 2d 462, 463 (1984).
242~
243~~ at 464, citing New Jersey code of criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. x 2c:
3-2a.
2State v. Tate, 477 A. 2d at 464-467.
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74thereby concluded that the medical necessity defense applied under New Jersey
law as well, and adopted the same criteria for that defense as the ~ court. On
this basis, the court denied the State's motion to exclude the medical necessity
defense, and ordered the trial to proceed accordingly 245
The State appealed the issue to the state appellate court, and that court
armed the trial judge's holding substantially for the reasons expressed by the
trial court. The appellate court added only that should defendant be acquitted
during the impending trial based on a medical necessity defense, his continued
use of marijuana will be justiable only until defendant could either obtain mar-
ijuana legally through a research program or until DHHS made synthetic THC
available to defendant.2 ~ The State once again appealed the issue of excluding
the medical necessity defense, seeking review by the Supreme Court of New
JerseyY7
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the trial and ap-
pellate courts, and held that the necessity defense was not available to charges
of marijuana possession.2'~ The court reasoned that the legislature's codica-
tion of common law in the New Jersey Penal Code reected a legislative intent
to create.., a systematic, consistent, comprehensive [state] code to replace the
hodgepodge of court-made common law. The court held that this
245State v. Tate, 477 A. 2d at 470.
2 ~5tate v. Tate, 486 A. 2d 1281 1282-1283 (1984)
247State v. Tate, 505 A. 2d 941 (1986).
248~
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75change in the basic responsibility for the growth and modernization of the crim-
inal law - - from court to legislature included a shift from court to legislature of
the responsibility for dening the scope of former common law defenses, such
as necessity39
The court noted that the state's statutory denition of necessity specied
that it should not be applied to situations where other code provisions ad-
dressing the particular situation exist3~ According to the court, the statutory
classication of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance indicated a leg-
islative intent specically to prohibit medical use of the substance, except in the
context of approved medical research3- Consequently, the court concluded that
the legislature had addressed and rejected the possibility of such use as Tate's,
and the court thereby held that the defense of 'medical necessity' is clearly pre-
cluded by statutory language. The court stated that this court's common law
gap-lling authority with regard to the criminal law should be exercised only
when there is in fact a gap to be lled, and concluded that because the legisla-
ture had eectively addressed the issue, the court need not look to the common
law defense of 'necessity' for guidance.~2
Nonetheless, the court reviewed the common law, holding that even under
the common law standard, unauthorized medical
249~ at 943.
at 944.
251~~ citing N.J.S.A. x 24:21-5(a).
2525tate v. Tate, 505 A. 2d at 945.
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76use of marijuana could not meet the criteria of necessity. The court stated that
the defendant failed to show the absence of an available alternative, due to the
continued functioning of the federal supply program and other limited research
initiatives. However, the court did not challenge defendant's assertion that the
available means are generally unimplemented and ineective, but instead rea-
soned that, even if defendant could not de facto receive marijuana through these
means, they remained de jure alternativesA3 The court found this sucient to
block medical marijuana use from the necessity defense on common law grounds.
In sum, the court concluded that it was precluded from applying common law
to Tate's situation since the New Jersey legislature had eectively barred the
medical marijuana necessity defense, but that, even if the court were permitted
to make a common law evaluation, the circumstances would not t the param-
eters of a necessity defense. On this basis, the court reversed the lower courts'
holdings, thereby barring Tate and other medical marijuana users in New Jersey
from employing a necessity defense to charges of unlawful possession 354
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached essentially the same re-
sult in its 1991 case Commonwealth v. kL~.liin~, although it reached that con-
clusion through signicantly dierent logic. The defendant in the case, Joseph
Hutchins, oered proof that he used marijuana to
253~ at 946.
254~ at 947.
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77alleviate his suering from progressive systemic sclerosis (scleroderma), which
included hypertension, loss of appetite, nausea, reduced motility, and swollen
joints355 The trial judge did not permit him to present a necessity defense to
his charges, and he was subsequently convicted356
On appeal, he oered substantial evidence showing that marijuana was the
most eective treatment for his symptoms, and the court acknowledged his
evidence as such, making no challenges as the Tate court did to whether it met
the basic testY7 However, the court noted that It must be understood... that the
oft-repeated principle, that the necessity defense is limited to certain specied
circumstances, does not mean that, wherever those circumstances obtain, the
defense is automatically available. 258
The court noted that the determination also depends on whether the harm
that would have resulted from compliance with the law signicantly outweighs
the harm that reasonably could result from the court's acceptance of necessity
as an excuse in the circumstances presented by the particular case.~9 The court
found that the harm to the public of
255commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E. 2d 741, 742 (1991)
256~
257The court did not dispute the strength of the evidence in proving the
essential elements of necessity: (1) the defendant is faced with a clear and
imminent danger, not one which debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant
can reasonably expect that his [or her] action will be eective as the direct
cause of abating the danger; (3) there is (no] legal alternative which will be
eective in abating the danger;' (4)
the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear
and
deliberate choice regarding the conduct at issue..I~. at 744.
258~
259I~
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78allowing the necessity defense would be greater than the harm to the defendant
of preventing him from using marijuana. Consequently, the court stated that
accepting the defendant's oer of proof, and assuming, as we do without deci-
sion, that the circumstances [required for necessity] ... obtain, nevertheless we
rule that defendant's proered evidence does not raise the defense of necessity.
The court explained that the alleviation of defendant's medical symptoms...
would not clearly and signicantly outweigh the potential harm to the public of
nding that defendant's conduct was not criminal.2W On this basis, the court
armed Tate's conviction,26 thereby placing Massachusetts among the states
not recognizing necessity as an armative defense to medical marijuana use.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has also stated that necessity is not an avail-
able defense of charges of marijuana possession. In SDillers v. State, the de-
fendant appealed from a trial court judgment that allowed less than two days
between appointment of defense counsel and the case's trial, claiming that this
was not sucient time to prepare the case and that the trial judge erred in not
allowing a continuance. The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld defendants'
claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to grant a con-
tinuance, but stated in dicta that the defendant would not be able to present a
defense of necessity to his charges, despite the fact that he
260~ at 745.
261~
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79claimed to use marijuana to alleviate his symptoms of rheumatoid arthritis.
The court stated, It is appropriate to point out that there are no armative
defenses as to possession or dissemination of marijuana for medical, health and
therapeutic purposes.~2 The court analogized the issue to that of use of pornog-
raphy, stating that the Legislature had specied certain instances in which what
would otherwise be classied as pornography could be used for educational pur-
poses, or for pornotherapy by a psychiatrist. The court reasoned that Marijuana
treatment or therapy appears not to have been medically or scientically recog-
nized within these professions, while on the other hand pornotherapy appears
to have been legally and scientically recognized and sanctioned under certain
conditions.~3 Thus, the court concluded that the legislature did not intend for
marijuana any exceptions from the general law prohibiting the drug, and the
court held that it was not within the judiciary's province to challenge that,
stating that for us to rule otherwise would be a judicial usurpation of a legisla-
tive prerogative.2 ~ Consequently, although the court ordered a continuance to
defendant for case preparation, the court specied that necessity could not be
presented as a defense once the case reached trial35~
262Spillers v. State, 245 S.E. 2d 54, 55 (1978).
263~
264j~
265~
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80The Minnesota Court of Appeals also rejected the possibility of allowing a medi-
cal marijuana user to present a necessity defense. In State v. Hanson, the Court
of Appeals held that the trial court had not erred in barring defendant from
presenting a medical necessity defense to a charge of marijuana manufacturing.
Defendant Hanson suered from epilepsy, and sought to present evidence at
trial that he used marijuana in order to control his symptoms. The trial judge
excluded the defense of medical necessity and testimony in support thereof, and
Hanson was subsequently convicted.
Reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to
exclude the medical necessity defense and supporting evidence, and concluded
that the legislature had essentially considered and rejected the possibility of
allowing an exception for medical use. The court reasoned that, by placing
marijuana in Schedule I and by specifying that therapeutic use of marijuana
was only permitted in certain approved and controlled research settings, state
legislation made clear that the legislature has specically addressed and deter-
mined the possible medical uses of marijuana.~ On this basis, the court held
that the trial court did not err in concluding that the medical necessity defense
cannot be applied to the possession or use of marijuana,267 thereby placing
Minnesota among those states that have held that the defense of necessity is
2 ~5tate v. Hanson, 468 N.W. 2d 77, 78 (1991)
267~ at 79.
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81unavailable to individuals who use marijuana for medical purposes.
Finally, Alabama has also joined the ranks of these states barring use of the
medical necessity defense for marijuana oenses, through its 1993 Court of Crim-
inal Appeals decision in Kauman v. State3~ The defendant, Scott Kauman,
was a paraplegic suering from uncontrollable muscle spasms and associated
crippling symptoms of an aiction [unspecied] that is progressing from para-
plegia to quadriplegia.2 ~ The defendant argued that the legally available medi-
cations (Tylox and Valium) reached plateaus of eectiveness, at which points
marijuana was the only medication that could relieve his suering.270 He sought
to introduce evidence of this at trial, and to present a defense of medical ne-
cessity, but the trial judge barred him from doing so. He was subsequently
convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana, and appealed to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama, seeking a judgment that the trial judge erred in
excluding his medical necessity defense 271
Employing much the same logic as the Minnesota court in Hanson, the Al-
abama appellate court held that it is the opinion of this Court that the Alabama
Legislature has precluded the appellant's use of the defense of medical
2 ~Kauman v. State, 620 So. 2d 90 (1993)
269~
270~ at 91.
271~ at 90|91.
80
82necessity.272 The court reasoned that, by attaching criminal penalties to the
manufacture and possession of marijuana, and by providing the opportunity for
its use under narrowly circumscribed medical research conditions, the Legisla-
ture had considered the issue and implicitly rejected the possibility of allowing
unsupervised medical use by those who could not obtain marijuana through
the limited means provided by medical research.273 Thus, the court held that
the trial judge acted correctly in excluding the medical necessity defense and
supporting evidence, and concluded that the medical necessity defense was not
available for marijuana oenses under Alabama law.
As noted at the beginning of this section, many states have not ruled on
this issue, because cases where the necessity defense could be appropriate are
often dropped at prosecutors' discretion.274 However, as the foregoing discussion
illustrates, those states that have considered the issue are divided on whether
medical necessity is ever an appropriate defense to marijuana possession charges.
In those states that have accepted it, the defense provides a signicant validation
and protection of medical marijuana use. As the next section of this essay will
discuss, state legislative initiatives also provide important means for recognizing
and defending the validity of medical marijuana use.
272~ at 92.
273~ at 93.
274~ Arnolds and Garland, ~ note 187.
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83State Statutory and Electoral Initiatives
In addition to judicial recourse though the medical necessity defense, state
initiatives in the legislative and electoral arenas have supported the medical
use of marijuana despite the drug's continuing federal schedule I status. Since
1978, over thirty states have passed resolutions or bills ocially recognizing
marijuana's medical value. These have ranged from non-binding resolutions
encouraging federal sanctioning of medical marijuana use, to bills that both
recognize marijuana's medical value and provide for intrastate studies on the
drug to be conducted as widely as federal law allows.275
In California, the legislature has taken even larger steps. Bills have passed
that would have made medical use of marijuana legal under state law, but
Governor Pete Wilson has vetoed these measures. In 1993 such a bill passed
both the
2755ee Alabama S.B. 559 (July 1979); Arizona H.B. 2020 (April 1980);
Arkansas Act 8 (April 1981); california S.B. 184 (July 1979); colorado
H.B. 1042 (June 1979); connecticut H.B. 5090 (July 1981); Florida H.B.
1237 (June 1978); Georgia H.B. 1077 (Feb. 1980); Illinois G.B. 2625
(Sept 1978); Iowa H.F. 512 (June 1979); Louisiana H.B. 1187 (July 1991);
Maine H.B. 665 (Aug. 1979); Massachusetts 5. 1582 (Dec. 1991); Michigan
5.B. 185 (cot. 1979); Minnesota H.F. 2476 (April 1980); Montana
H.B. 463
(April 1979); Nevada S.B. 470 (June 1979); New Hampshire S.B. 21 (April
1981); New Jersey A.B. 819 (March 1981); New Mexico H.B. 329 (Feb.
1978); New York S.B. 1123-6 (June 1980); North carolina H.B. 1065 (June
1979); Ohio S.B. 184 (March 1980); Oklahoma S.R. 7 (March 1981); Oregon
H.B. 2267 (June 1979); Rhode Island H.B. 79.6072 (May 1980); South
carolina 5.B. 350 (Feb. 1980); Tennessee H.B. 314 (April 1981); Texas
5.B. 877 (June 1979); Vermont H.B. 130 (April 1981); virginia 5.B.
913
(March 1979); Washington H.B. 259 (March 1979); West Virginia S.B.
366
(March 1979); Wisconsin L.B. 697 (April 1982). $~ ~ Dawn Brazell,
Marijuana as Medicine, Post and courier, August 24, 1995, at Bi; and
Tracie cone, Reefer Madness, San Jose Mercury News, May 14, 1995, at
Al (both stories mentioning that the majority of states have passed nonbinding
statutory resolutions favoring medical marijuana availability.)
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84House and Senate of California, but was vetoed by Governor Wilson on Septem-
ber 30, 1994.276 Another bill, essentially duplicating the rst, was introduced
in February 1995, passed both houses, and was vetoed by Governor Wilson on
October 15, 19952 The bills provided that the prohibition against possession,
cultivation, or use of marijuana would not apply to an individual who pos-
sessed, grew, or processed marijuana for personal medical use or for the medical
use of another individual of whom the person is an immediate family member,
guardian, or primary caretaker. The bills required that, in order for an indi-
vidual to qualify for protection under their provisions, he or she must obtain
approval in writing from a licensed physician or surgeon, and that approval must
specify that the use is specically for the treatment of AIDS, cancer, glaucoma,
or multiple sclerosis.278
According to Governor Wilson's Deputy Press Secretary, Jesus Arredondo,
Wilson vetoed the bill based on deference to federal authorities as well as a
pragmatic concern with signing state legislation that would leave those Califor-
nians who followed it subject to federal prosecution. Said Arredondo, Twice the
FDA has looked at marijuana for medical purposes and twice rejected it.... If we
were to have allowed these laws, physicians and pharmacists would be subject
to federal prosecution for following them. 279
276california S.B. No. 1364, introduced 1993, passed 1994, vetoed 1994.
277california A.B. No. 1529, introduced 1995, passed 1995, vetoed 1995.
278california A.B. No. 1529, xx 1 and 2. california S.B. No. 1364, xx 1
and 2.
279Telephone Interview with Jesus Arredondo, Deputy Press Secretary for
Pete Wilson (March 25, 1996)
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85However, the California legislature has not given up on the possibility of adopt-
ing such legislation, as two bills addressing medical marijuana use have been
introduced in 1996 and are currently in committee. California Assembly Bill
No.
2933 was introduced on February 23, 1996, and has been before
the Assembly Committee on Public Safety since March 7 of this year. That
bill contains the same substantive provisions as the two aforementioned bills
that Governor Wilson vetoed.280 Governor Wilson's oce has armed that
the Governor's position on the issue has not changed, and has stated that, if
this bill passed the legislature, the Governor would most probably veto it as
well. Nonetheless, the Governor's representatives admit that the continuing
legislative controversy has served the cause of medical marijuana proponents in
one respect, as it has heightened public awareness on the issue.~1
The California legislature is also presently considering another bill on med-
ical marijuana use, which presents a middle ground between the present law
under which medical marijuana users are committing felonies, and the system
proposed by the above-discussed bills under which medical use would be le-
gal. California Assembly Bill No. 2120, introduced on January 31, 1996, would
provide that any individual who grows, processes, or possesses marijuana for
personal medical use, under the written approval of a licensed physician or sur-
geon, would be guilty of a
280california A.B. No. 2933, xx 1|3.
281Telephone Interview with Jesus Arredondo, ~ note 279.
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86misdemeanor, rather than a felony.~2 The bill has been before the Assembly
Committee on Public Safety since February 26, 1996, and Governor Wilson's
oce has no comment on whether the Governor would sign the bill if it were
passed.283
These initiatives by the California legislature have been joined by local and
grassroots eorts. The City of West Hollywood, for example, unanimously
passed City Council resolution 95-1513 on December 4, 1995, encouraging the
legalization of the compassionate use of marijuana for medical purposes.2 ~ The
resolution asserts that medical use of marijuana has been denied by Governor
Pete Wilson and members of the United States Congress for political rather than
medical reasons, and it calls upon the State of California not to punish medical
marijuana users or their primary caregivers if the marijuana use is undertaken
at a physician's recommendation3~5
A sentiment similar to that behind this non-binding local resolution has led
Californians from across the state to undertake a major grassroots petitioning
drive, in an eort to have the issue of medical marijuana use placed on Cal-
ifornia's November 1996 ballot. The California Constitution enables citizens
to bypass the legislature and Governor in enacting legislation by having the
electorate
282california A.B. No. 2120, xx 1 and 2. Under existing california law, every
person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes marijuana is guilty
of a felony. See california Health and Safety code, x 11358.
283Telephone Interview with Jesus Arredondo, ~jj, note 279.
2 ~West Hollywood city council, Res. No. 95-1513, December 4, 1995.
285k
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87vote directly on a measure. The California State Constitution, Art. II section
8(b), provides that, in order to have a provision placed on the state ballot for
such a vote, the proponents of the issue must present to the Secretary of State
a petition signed by a specied minimum percentage of the voting population.2 ~
A citizens group, Californians for Compassionate Use (CCU) is leading these
eorts to have such an initiative placed on the November 1996 ballot.2 ~ The
ballot provision, entitled the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, would amend the
California Health and Safety Code by removing prohibitions against possession
or cultivation of marijuana by patients with doctors' recommendations or by
the patients' primary caretakers for use by the patients.2 ~ CCU is distributing
ballots manually by canvassing neighborhoods as well as electronically through
the Internet .~
If enough signatures are secured for the measure to obtain ballot access, and
if a majority of the electorate then votes in favor of the provision in November
1996, it will become law, and will not be subject to the Governor's approval as
the legislative bills have been.290 Nonetheless,
286california State constitution, Art. II, Sec. 8(b). In order to obtain
ballot access, this type of measure must receive the signatures of 13 percent of
the voting population. l~.
287lnternet Homepage of californians for compassionate use. ~ Press release of
the Marijuana Policy Project, March 20, 1995, retrieved from the Internet.
288Petition for california compassionate use Act of 1996, retrieved from the In-
ternet, Homepage of the cyber-campaign for Medical Marijuana (ccMM), Santa
Monica, CA, a subsidiary of californians for compassionate use.
289~
299california State constitution, Article II, Section 8(b).
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88Governor Wilson's Deputy Press Secretary, Jesus Arredondo,
warns that the law would not be binding, because we [at the state level] cannot
supersede federal law, which prohibits such medical use. Arredondo maintains
that the electoral ballot provision would be more symbolic than anything else,
since medical use would still be subject to federal prosecution.291 Clearly, how-
ever, this has not dissuaded proponents of the initiative, who continue to lobby
for support as the April 19 deadline for collecting the necessary 700,000 sig-
natures approaches.292
Although California is the rst state to launch a ballot initiative for a pro-
vision addressing medical marijuana use specically, attempts have been made
elsewhere to obtain state ballot access for measures which would legalize mar-
ijuana generally. California's petitioning drive follows the lead set by a two
unsuccessful attempts in Colorado to place a marijuana legalization amend-
ment on the state ballot in 1992 and 1994, in accordance with Colorado State
Constitution Art. V section l(1)-(5.5).~~ These petitioning drives were spon-
sored by the Colorado Hemp Initiative Project, a group formed in 1992 with
the express purpose of seeking state ballot access for the Cannabis and
291Telephone Interview with Jesus Arredondo, ~ note 279.
292Telephone Interview with Nicholas corbin, Assistant to the Director of cali-
fornians for compassionate use (March 25, 1996).
293colorado State constitution, Art. V., sec. 1 (l)-(5.5) provides that citizens
may gain direct access to the ballot by obtaining on a petition the signatures
of a requisite percentage of the electorate. This provision is substantively the
same as california's constitutional provision on state ballot initiatives, discussed
above.
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89Hemp Re-Legalization Amendment.294 This amendment, on which the 1992 and
1994 petitioning drives were both based, was much broader than the present
California petitioning proposal, as it sought legalization of marijuana for all
uses,295 rather than solely for medical purposes as the California initiative pro-
poses. Both the 1992 and 1994 Colorado petitioning drives failed to secure
enough signatures for state ballot access, a result which the Colorado Hemp
Initiative Project attributes to inadequate funding, poor organization, and a
low petition return rate.296 Although not currently undertaking a third ballot
initiative, the group plans to do so in the future, and it views the problems
confronting it in its past attempts merely as factors which we need to remedy
in the future.297
In Oregon, citizens are presently undertaking a petitioning drive to place
a measure for broadbased legalization of marijuana on the November 1996
state ballot, in accordance with Article IV section 1(2) (a) of the Oregon State
Constitution.298 Like the failed Colorado initiatives, the Oregon measure does
not address medical marijuana use
294Hemp Ballot Initiative Update, colorado Hemp Initiative Project, re-
trieved from the Internet, colorado Hemp Initiative Homepage. 295cannabis and
Hemp Re-legalization Amendment, prepared by the colorado Hemp Initiative
Project, retrieved from the Internet. This Amendment would have added
to the colorado constitution a section entitled Repeal of Marijuana
and Marijuana concentrate Laws, which would have invalidated all
state laws restricting cultivation, access, or use or marijuana or hemp.
2 ~Hemp Ballot Initiative update, ~ note 294.
297Id
298Oregon State constitution, Art. IV, sec. 1(2) (a). Like the provisions of
the california and colorado State constitutions discussed above, this measure in
the Oregon State constitution provides that citizens may obtain direct
ballot access for proposed statutory measures by securing the signatures of a
requisite percentage of the state electorate.
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90specically, but rather it seeks to lift prohibitions on marijuana use generally.
However, this current Oregon proposal is constructed in an original fashion, as it
would establish government regulation of the industry, and would direct prots
from that industry towards education (96 percent of prots) and drug abuse
treatment (4 percent of prots) ~299 Indicative of its purpose, the petitioning
drive is being led by a group called Pay for Schools by Regulating Cannabis 300
Specically, this initiative seeks to place on the November 1996 Oregon bal-
lot a measure entitled The Oregon Cannabis Tax Act of 1997. The Act would
legalize marijuana, under the regulatory auspices of the Oregon Liquor Con-
trol Commission, which would be renamed under the Act as the Oregon Drug
Control Commission.301 The Commission would have authority over licensing
marijuana producers, and would sell cannabis through state liquor stores.3~
The same age restrictions that govern alcohol sales would apply to sale of mari-
juana, blocking minors from access.303 Prots from licensing and sales would be
channeled to education and drug abuse treatment, in the following proportions:
65 percent to state school districts, 30 percent to state institutions of higher
education, 4 percent to the department of Human
299Paul Stanford, Pay for Schools by Regulating cannabis, July 21,
1994, retrieved from the Internet, Homepage of Pay for Schools by
Regulating cannabis, Portland, OR.
300~
301The Oregon cannabis Tax Act of 1997, xx 2, 3:474.095.
3 ~ 2The Oregon cannabis Tax Act of 1997, xx 3:474.035, 3:474.055. at x 3:474.065.
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91Resources to fund drug abuse treatment programs, and 1 percent to state school
districts to fund a drug education program in the schools.304 The group Pay for
Schools by Regulating Cannabis must collect 70,000 signatures in order for this
measure to gain access to the ballot, and it has until July 1996 to do so.305
As mentioned previously, neither the Colorado nor the Oregon initiative
was designed to address the specic issue of medical marijuana use, as the
California electoral initiative was. However, although California's is the only
electoral ballot initiative that limits itself to medical marijuana use, California
is not the only state undergoing a struggle to reform state laws on that specic
issue. As in California, the Massachusetts Legislature recently passed a bill
that would shield certied medical marijuana users from punishment, and the
Governor has not accepted the bill. Proposed statute H2170, which provided
that medical necessity would be a defense to the charges of marijuana possession
or use in the state of Massachusetts,~ passed both houses of the legislature in
October 1995.307 On November 13, 1995, however, Governor Weld rejected the
bill, and returned it the Legislature with a proposed amendment that would
allow
at x 3:474.075.
305Paul Stanford, Pay for Schools by Regulating cannabis, ~ note
299.
306As discussed earlier in this essay, the Massachusetts judiciary has not
allowed medical marijuana users to employ the common-law necessity defense.
This bill proposed to codify that defense, which courts in a few states have
accepted as common law, as discussed previously in this essay.
3 ~'Relative to the Possession of Marijuana for Medical Purposes, Mass. House
No. 2170.
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92medical marijuana use only by individuals who possessed marijuana pursuant
to the State Department of Public Health Therapeutic Research Program.308
This amendment essentially rendered the bill powerless, because there are no
marijuana recipients under the state Therapeutic Research Program. It does
not appear that there will be any such recipients in the near future, because the
federal government is the only legal source of marijuana for the Program, and
it has stopped providing a legal supply of medical marijuana, ~~ as discussed
earlier in this essay.30 Technically, the bill is still alive, with Weld's amendment,3
but proponents of the original bill have asserted that the Governor's action
eectively vetoed the bill.312
The bill's sponsor, Representative Jehlen, attempted to reach a compromise
with Weld, but such eorts were fruitless. According to Monica Hileman, Leg-
islative Aide to Representative Jehlen, There was some negotiation, but it looks
as if we're going to have to override the veto. However, Hileman notes that it's
a very touchy subject for some people, and that consequently some politicians
may hesitate to support such a measure. In that political
308Relative to the Possession of Marijuana for Medical Purposes, Mass.
House No. 5632, citing Mass. Gen. L. ch. 94(c), x 34.
309Dolores Kong, Pot, a Balm to Some, Faces a New Hurdle, IbL~n
~ November 25, 1995, at 13.
3105ee Part III of this essay, section entitled Medical Marijuana Access
through the Federal Investigational New Drug Program.
3Mass. House No. 5632 has been forwarded to the committee on House
Bills in the Third Reading.
312Michael cutler, Medical Marijuana Legislation Progresses Through the
State House, March 3, 1996, retrieved from the Internet, Homepage of
The Massachusetts cannabis Reform coalition, Inc., Marblehead, MA.
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93climate, it remains to be seen whether the bill can garner enough support to
override Weld's veto.313
Federal Legislative Initiatives
On November 10, 1995, Representative Barney Frank (DMassachusetts) intro-
duced a bill that would legalize medical marijuana use and would place its pro-
duction and distribution under federal regulatory authority.314 This bill, H.R.
2618, is substantively identical to a bill that was introduced in 1981, 1983, and
1985, by Representative Stewart McKinney CR-Connecticut) 315 When the
bill was originally proposed in 1981, as H.R. 4498, it garnered 74 co-sponsors
from both parties,316 including Representative Newt Gingrich, who was at that
time a second-term Congressman.317 Its 1983 reintroduction as H.R. 2282 at-
tracted 66 co-sponsors, some of whom had not co-sponsored the 1981 legislation.
In 1985, when reintroduced as H.R. 2232, the bill attained 28 cosponsors. Of
the representatives who co-sponsored this legislation at least once in the 1980s,
38 are still in Congress 318
313Telephone interview with Monica Hileman, Legislative Aide to Mass.
Rep. Jehlen, Boston, MA (March 27, 1996).
314H.R. 2618, 104th cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
315H.R. 4498, 97th cong., 1st Sess. (1981). H.R. 2282, 98 cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). H.R. 2232, 99th cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
316H.R. 4498, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
317Telephone Interview with John cox, Press Assistant for Speaker of the
House Newt Gingrich (March 26, 1996). Gingrich changed his position on the
issue, however, before reintroduction of the bill in 1983, and consequently he did
not cosponsor the bill in either 1983 or 1985. According to his Press Assistant,
John cox, he will not cosponsor the current bill either.
318The following are still members of the u.s. House of Representatives:
Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Anthony Beilenson CD-cA), Tom Bevill (D-AL), David
Bonior (D-MI), George Brown CD-CA), cardiss collins (D-IL), John conyers
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94The current reintroduction of the bill is entitled A bill to provide for the
therapeutic use of marijuana in situations involving life-threatening or sense-
threatening illnesses and to provide adequate supplies of marijuana for such
use.319 The bill would amend the Controlled Substances Act by moving mari-
juana from Schedule I to Schedule II, and would give the Secretary of Health
and Human Services the authority to promulgate regulations for its produc-
tion and distribution.320 The bill would also amend the Controlled Substances
Act to create in HHS an Oce for the Supply of Internationally Controlled
Drugs, charged with the responsibility of overseeing the domestic production of
marijuana for medical and scientic purposes.32'
Under the bill's provisions, the Secretary would take all necessary actions to
maintain a domestic supply of marijuana adequate to meet medical and scientic
needs, by soliciting bids on contracts for cultivation and delivery of marijuana.
Within four months of the end of the marijuana harvest, the Oce would be
authorized to take physical
CD-MI), Ron Dellums CD-cA), Vic Fazio (D-cA), Horold Ford (D-TN),
Barney
Frank CD-MA), Sam Gejdenson (D-cT), Sam Gibbons CD-FL), Newt Gingrich
(R-GA), Marcy Kaptur CD-OH), Barbara Kennelly (D-cT), John LaFalce
CD-
NY), Tom Lantos (D-cA), Sander Levin CD-MI), Bill Mccollum CR-FL),
George Miller (D-cA), Norman Mineta (D-cA), James Oberstar CD-MN),
John
Porter (R-IL), Nick Rahall CD-WV), charles Rangel CD-NY), Pete Stark CDcA),
Louis Stokes (D-OH), Gerry Studds CD-MA), Edolphus Towns (D-NY),
Bruce Vento (D-MN), Frank Wolf (R-VA), Sidney Yates CD-IL). The
following are now Senators: Judd Gregg CR-NH), Tom Harkin CD-IA), James
Jef fords CR-VT), Paul Simon CD-IL), Olympia Snowe (R-ME). See also
Mariluana Policy Report, August 1995, retrieved from the Internet,
Marijuana Policy Report Homepage. 319H.R. 2618, 104th cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
320~~, xx 2 and 3(a).
321~, x 3(b), adding to Part c of the controlled substances Act x
311(a).
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95possession of the marijuana harvested. If the Oce informed the Secretary
that an inadequate supply of marijuana for medical and scientic purposes had
been harvested, the Secretary would declare a state of emergency, and would
make contractual arrangements for importation of enough marijuana to meet
domestic needs.322
The bill sets forth procedures for the distribution of medical marijuana,
under which physicians would le written applications to the Oce seeking
permission to prescribe marijuana, and hospitals and pharmacies would obtain
supplies from the government to ll prescriptions. The Secretary would be di-
rected to set a price for marijuana that would recoup the costs incurred by
the government under this program. The Secretary would also be instructed to
promulgate regulations to insure an adequate supply of medically usable mari-
juana, and to guard against the drug's diversion to illegitimate uses. Pursuant
to the latter objective, the bill proposes penalties for using a medicinal mari-
juana order form for an unauthorized purpose.3 ~Further, the bill would amend
section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide that the
Secretary's approval is not required for introduction or delivery of marijuana
into interstate commerce, and to dene marijuana as a prescription drug for use
only by authorized physicians for specied purposes.3 ~ Finally, the bill would
authorize $5
322~, x 3(b), adding to Part c of the controlled Substances Act x 312.
323~~, x 3(b), adding to Part c of the controlled Substances Act x 313.
324j~., x 4, amending xx 505(a) and 503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
cosmetic Act.
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96million for each of the law's rst two years in operation for the funding of the
Oce, and would establish interim provisions ensuring that current recipients
of federal marijuana supplies would continue to receive the drug during imple-
mentation of the new law.3 ~
So far, the bill has attracted 13 co-sponsors, of which 2 are Republicans
and 11 are Democrats.3 ~The bill has been sent to the Judiciary and Commerce
Committees, but no hearings on the bill have yet taken place.327 Although there
is not requisite number of co-sponsors necessary in order for the House to take
action on the bill, some proponents believe that it will probably be necessary
for a few dozen representatives to rst co-sponsor the bill in order for hearings
to begin.3 ~
Conclusion:
Although attempts to reschedule marijuana under the provisions set forth in the
Controlled Substances Act have failed, proponents of medical marijuana use are
actively
~ xx 5 and 6.
3 ~As of March 26, 1996, the co-sponsors were: Anthony Beilenson CD-CA),
Tom Campbell CR-CA), John Conyers CD-MI), Ron Dellums CD-CA), Steve
Gunderson CR-Wisconsin), Harry Johnston CD-Florida), Joseph Kennedy (DMA),
Zoe Lofgren CD-CA), John Olver CD-MA), Nancy Pelosi CD-CA), Pete Stark
CD-CA), Gerry Studds CD-MA), and Lynn Woolsey CD-CA). Telephone inter-
view with Linda Crawford, Secretary to the House Judiciary Committee Minor-
ity Sta CMarch 26, 1996).
327~
3 ~Medical Marijuana Bill Introduced in Congress, Mariluana Policy
~ Nov./Dec. 1995, retrieved from the Internet, Marijuana Policy Project
Homepage.
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97pursuing alternate means of changing the laws on the issue. It is not yet clear
whether these reformers will secure their objectives, but the struggle itself re-
veals important features of our government and society. In essence, by illumi-
nating the myriad means through which the populace can make its voice heard
in our nation, the controversy over medical marijuana use demonstrates the
successful functioning of our federalist democracy.
As discussed in Part II, advocates of medical marijuana legalization reaped
no change from their repeated attempts at reform through the administrative
petitioning and judicial review provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. But
this statutorily prescribed channel did not represent reformers' only means for
eecting change. Robert Randall's legal action against the government, and his
consequent receipt of marijuana under the IND Program, demonstrated that
people can sometimes attain necessary individual attention from the federal
government. However, medical marijuana users' gains under the IND Program
were short-lived, thereby proving this approach ineective at addressing the
scope of the issue. Consequently, reformers have sought other alternatives for
change.
At the state level, the struggle for reform of medical marijuana laws exhibits
the continued functioning of our federalist system as well as its separation of
powers. In the judicial branches of some states, signicant strides have been
made in the common law, through the acceptance of
96
98the medical necessity defense to charges of marijuana possession and use. State
legislatures have responded to constituent pressure by passing resolutions rec-
ognizing marijuana's medicinal value, and the state legislatures of California
and Massachusetts have voted in favor of bills that would shield medical mari-
juana users from punishment. Some argue that intrastate legalization measures
would prove powerless against the continuing federal prohibition, but it is pos-
sible that the federal government might defer to the will of such states by not
enforcing federal marijuana laws therein if such legislation were passed. More-
over, regardless of their ultimate application, such eorts, like the non-binding
state resolutions encouraging federal legalization, demonstrate states' continu-
ing reliance on their localized power under our federalist system. The past and
present state electoral ballot initiatives also suggest that reformist activism at
a grassroots level remains a viable and powerful means of eecting statutory
change.
Finally, the Congressional reintroduction of the medical marijuana bill demon-
strates that, even if an issue has been delegated to an agency, it ultimately
remains the province of the people through their elected representatives. The
reemergence of this question in Congress despite the issue's previous delegation
to an administrative agency demonstrates that authority cannot be sequestered
from the province of the electorate.
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99It remains to be seen how the medical marijuana bill will be received in Congress,
and how the various state initiatives will play themselves out. Private citizens,
courts, and elected ocials across the country espouse widely diering opinions
on medical marijuana use, in an unresolved debate which has been described as
a culture war between the ower-power crowd that believes in natural medicine,
and the scientic establishment that believes in white powders.329 Regardless of
its ultimate outcome, however, the continuing struggle for legalization of medical
use illuminates the many avenues for reformist activism available in our country
and, on a more fundamental level, reveals that the principles of federalism and
democracy continue to animate our national polity.
329Telephone interview with Mark Kleiman, ~ note 156.
98
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